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As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we were doing
essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our society’s
traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty much left us alone.
Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about.
But if in reality our processes of constitutional adjudication consists primarily
of making value judgments . . . then a free and intelligent people’s attitude
towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different. The people
know that their value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law
school—maybe better . . . confirmation hearings for new [J]ustices should
deteriorate into question-and-answer sessions in which senators go through a
list of their constituents’ most favored and disfavored alleged constitutional
rights, and seek the nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them.
—Justice Scalia

I. INTRODUCTION
Talk of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is in the air. Indeed, it is almost
unavoidable. Critics argue the Court is in danger of being perceived by the
public as illegitimate. Is that true? If so, what consequences would likely
follow? This Article will address the question of the Court’s legitimacy in
the present political context. After a brief introduction, it will discuss the
concept of institutional judicial legitimacy as it has come to be understood
by political scientists. Then, building on Justice Scalia’s dissent in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,1 it will briefly discuss those methodologies that
Justice Scalia referred to as “lawyers’ work”—the analytical techniques that
the Justices have traditionally relied on to interpret the Constitution.
Further, the Article will engage in an extended review of several historical
periods in history in which the public questioned the Court’s legitimacy. It
will be argued that often, though not always, the Court was able to preserve
its legitimacy through the engagement of what Justice Scalia characterized
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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as “lawyer’s work.” Finally, it will be argued that when the public seriously
questions the Court’s legitimacy, the constitutional check provided through
the appointment and confirmation authority has slowly but surely resolved
the crisis. The Article will maintain that recent changes to the Court’s
composition are simply one more example of the political system employing
the constitutionally based appointment and confirmation process to address
public dissatisfaction with the Court. The cries of illegitimacy are little more
than an anguished response to this change.
It is no secret that we live in politically polarized times. The political
polarization has enveloped every governmental institution, including the
Supreme Court. The bitter political struggle over the confirmation of
Justice Brett Kavanaugh brought the political dispute over the Court into
Many who bitterly opposed the replacement of
public focus.2
Justice Kennedy with Justice Kavanaugh assumed the appointment would
lead to a solid conservative majority on the Court that would overrule or
significantly narrow decisions they prefer, or at the very least would render
it far more difficult to persuade the Court to use constitutional
interpretation to deliver desired political results.
Many of
Justice Kavanaugh’s supporters hoped that was exactly what might well
happen and had voted for President Trump in anticipation of that
possibility. It was a heated and bitter political battle but well within the
boundaries set by the Constitution.
Following the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, both
nominated by President Trump, editorials, op-eds, and blogs argued that
conservative
oriented
decisions—especially
those
favoring
President Trump and his policies—will raise serious questions as to the
legitimacy of the Court as an institution.3 Five senators filed an amicus brief
2. See generally CARL HULSE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE WASHINGTON’S WAR OVER THE
SUPREME COURT, FROM SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH (2020) (explaining the political
fight involved in the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh); MOLLIE HEMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO,
JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE KAVANAUGH CONFIRMATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(2019) (showing a detailed account of the political battles surrounding Judicial confirmations from
Robert Bork in 1987 to Brett Kavanaugh in 2018).
3. Joshua A. Geltzer, Will the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court Survive the Census Case?, N.Y. TIMES
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/opinion/census-citizenship-question(May 31,
supreme-court-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/2RSR-FZEV]; Ronald Brownstein, Brett Kavanaugh
is Patient Zero, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2018/10/kavanaughs-partisanship-threatens-supreme-court/571702/
[https://perma.cc/F7V3M95P] (“President Trump’s nominee would bring a virus of illegitimacy and partisanship to the
Supreme Court.”); Paul Waldman, Yes the Supreme Court Is Facing a Legitimacy Crisis and We Know Exactly
Whose Fault It Is, WASH POST. (Sept. 24, 2018, 2:06 PM CDT), https://www.washington
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with the Court in a New York gun regulation case threatening the Court
with “restructuring” if it did not dismiss the case.4 These warnings of
potential illegitimacy may be attributable to at least four factors. At least
some of this onslaught is aimed at Chief Justice Roberts and is certainly
intended to intimidate him into rejecting the conservative majority in key
areas.5 It is widely believed that Chief Justice Roberts may have taken such
institutional arguments seriously in his decisions to vote to reject the
challenge to the Affordable Care Act,6 to find that the provision of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination “because of sex”
applied to homosexuals and transgenders,7 to temporarily halt President

post.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/09/24/yes-the-supreme-court-is-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis-andwe-know-exactly-whose-fault-it-is/ [https://perma.cc/2JVP-5HSZ]; Ian Millhiser, Brett Kavanaugh is an
Existential Threat to the Supreme Court, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://archive.
thinkprogress.org/brett-kavanaugh-risks-destroying-the-supreme-courts-legitimacy-684e7627961e/
[https://perma.cc/9A2V-6MA9]; Amelia Thompson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is The Supreme Court
Facing a Legitimacy Crisis?, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirty
eight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/7UPB-65PZ];
Richard L. Hasen, The Census Case Is Shaping Up to be the Biggest Travesty Since Bush v. Gore, SLATE
(June 25, 2019, 6:29 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/census-case-john-robertsbush-v-gore-tragedy.html [https://perma.cc/4Z4X-H6WT]; see Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s
Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 n.1 (2019) (citing a collection of further articles alleging
that the Court is illegitimate).
4. Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Mazie Hirono, Richard Blumenthal, Richard Durbin,
and Kirsten Gillibrand as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280); see Senators File an Enemy-of-the-Court
Brief, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2019, 11:48 AM ET) [https://perma.cc/D6V7-BMK6] (“‘The Supreme
Court is not well,’ they tell the Justices in what is really an enemy-of-the-Court brief. ‘Perhaps the
Court can heal itself before the public demands it be restructured in order to reduce the influence of
politics.’”). The case was dismissed as moot on April 27, 2020.
5. The Editorial Board, The Assault on the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2019, 6:55 PM
ET) [https://perma.cc/PDU9-DXFJ] (noting the Democratic strategy “includes regular campaigns
lecturing Chief Justice Roberts about ‘legitimacy’ whenever a case with political implications is heard”);
Kevin D. Williamson, John Roberts, Eternal Hostage, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 16, 2020, 6:30 AM)
[https://perma.cc/PRZ6-ZT2L].
6. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597–98 (2012) (showing
Chief Justice Roberts accepted the challenger’s argument that the individual mandate of the Act could
not be sustained under the commerce power but then concluded that it could be sustained as a potential
exercise of the congressional taxing power). The Roberts decision to uphold the Affordable Care Act
has been widely interpreted as an attempt to protect the Court’s institutional credibility during an
election year. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 283 (2012).
7. See Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020) (“[T]hese cases involve
no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings. For an
employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer must
intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex. That has always
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Trump’s repeal of DACA,8 and in deciding the Census Case9 as well. It is
understandable that those opposed to more conservative results would
assume that in any major politically controversial case that Chief
Justice Roberts could be swayed.10 The critics charge that if the Court
decides cases, especially those involving the President or his policies, in a
politically conservative manner, it will lose its legitimacy as an institution.
As such, the charges of potential illegitimacy are designed to influence the
Chief Justice.
The second reason for the illegitimacy claims is to influence the public
against the Court.11 The critics may believe that if they can succeed in
convincing a significant portion of the public that the Court is behaving in
a partisan and non-judicial manner, the public may rally against the Court
politically by pressuring Senators to vote against future conservative
been prohibited by Title VII’s plain terms—and that ‘should be the end of the analysis.’”) (citation
omitted).
8. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020)
(“[W]hen an agency rescinds a prior policy its reasoned analysis must consider the ‘alternatives’ that
are ‘within the ambit of the existing policy’ . . . . But the rescission memorandum contains no
discussion of forbearance or the option of retaining forbearance without benefits. [The memorandum]
‘entirely failed to consider [that] important aspect of the problem.’”) (citations omitted).
9. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (“[W]e cannot ignore
the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given. Our review is deferential, but . . .
not required . . . . The reasoned explanation requirement . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer
genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the
interested public.”) (citations omitted) (quotation omitted).
10. Ilya Shapiro, How the Supreme Court Undermines Its Own Legitimacy, WASH. EXAMINER (July 18,
2019, 11:00 PM) [https://perma.cc/7C9J-MQQN] (stating the threat to legitimacy claims will continue
as “a cynical tactic that will continue so long as it appears to be an effective guilt trip against
‘institutionalist’ judges such as Chief Justice John Roberts”). By accepting the threat to legitimacy
arguments and issuing compromise decisions to appease the critics, Shapiro argues the Court actually
undermines its legitimacy. Id. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI.
KENT L. REV 505 (2018) (using a similar argument); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign,
12 HARV. L. REV., 1, 8 (2012) (explaining legal “intelligentsia” used threats of illegitimacy to bully Chief
Justice Roberts to vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act); The Editorial Board, Senators File an Enemyof-the-Court Brief, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2019, 11:48 PM ET) [https://perma.cc/D6V7-BMK6] (“When
liberals worry about losing a major Supreme Court case, they usually make appeals to the Court’s
legitimacy.”).
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 155, 189 (2007) (noting that “meaning entrepreneurs” might use the media to rally the public
against particular interpretations by the Court). Sunstein notes that on difficult questions of
constitutional interpretation, public outrage could provide the Court with useful information. Id.
at 176; see also MOLLIE HEMMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 304 (“Make no
mistake, the smear campaigns against judicial nominees are themselves an attack on the Court’s
legitimacy.”).
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nominees. Alternatively, the critics may hope to encourage readers to vote
against Presidential candidates inclined to nominate conservatives to future
vacancies or senators inclined to confirm such nominees. Additionally, the
critics may hope to drive down respect for the Court as an institution in
public opinion polls causing the Justices to moderate their opinions in
response.
The third reason for the warnings of illegitimacy is that many of the critics
of the Court are true believers in a “living constitution” approach to
constitutional interpretation, under which the Court employs open ended
phrases in the document—including equal protection and due process—to
achieve progressive results. These critics believe that this is the correct
approach to constitutional interpretation and that a Supreme Court majority
that would reject an interpretive approach, substituting instead a far more
constraining methodology such as textualism or originalism, would indeed
render the Court illegitimate. Indeed, some of the claims of illegitimacy are
based on a deep and heart-felt disagreement about the role of the Court and
appropriate interpretive methodology.
Finally, the critics arguing that the Court is behaving illegitimately may
simply be venting their anger after concluding that the confirmation of
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh significantly decreases the possibility that
the Court can be convinced to issue decisions confirming their political
positions. Over the past sixty years, the Court has been amenable to
progressive social and legal change through constitutional adjudication.
Liberals and progressives have come to rely on the Court as a means of
effecting political change that could not be achieved readily through the
political process. Those who have come to rely on the Court as an
instrument of liberal and progressive political change have tended to view
this type of adjudication as normal and neutral. Hence, the potential
diminishment of this avenue of political relief seems disconcerting causing
some to lash out in rage.
The question of judicial legitimacy is not new. It is well accepted that an
unelected, politically unaccountable court, with no direct enforcement
power depends on public support and approval, often characterized as
moral capital or legitimacy, to obtain compliance with its decisions, which
very frequently dissatisfy significant segments of the public. The issue of
institutional legitimacy, especially judicial legitimacy, has long been of
interest to political scientists, legal academics, philosophers, and
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sociologists.12 In these disciplines, the discussion is generally arcane,
academic, and of little interest or understanding to the general public.
Academics have identified at least two types of legitimacy: moral and
sociological.13 Moral legitimacy, largely of concern to philosophers, tends
to concentrate on whether particular decisions or doctrines are morally
proper, hence legitimate, in a jurisprudential sense.14 That sense of
legitimacy is of slight interest to the present controversy. Rather, the focus
here is on sociological legitimacy, which focuses on public approval or
disapproval of particular decisions or of the Court as an institution.15
Sociological legitimacy is the domain of political scientists rather than moral
philosophers and is closer to the type of legitimacy at the center of recent
discourse. The argument is that decisions favoring the President and his
policies by a Supreme Court majority that he helped to create will endanger
the Court’s legitimacy. Is that true? And if so, what will be the institutional
and societal consequences?
Justice Scalia was correct in arguing that as long as the Court engages in
“lawyers’ work” the public will generally leave it alone. Research confirms
12. See James L. Gibson & Michael Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional
Wisdoms, and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 1 (2014) (“Perhaps no concept
in social science has received as much attention as the age-old concept of ‘legitimacy.’”) [hereinafter
Gibson & Nelson, Conventional Wisdoms]; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
SUPREME COURT 2 (2018) (examining the role legal and moral legitimacy play in legal correctness and
incorrectness from the Court’s decisions); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 775, 791 (2001) (arguing that contrary to the assertion of many legal academics, the decision in
Bush v. Gore did not threaten the Court’s legitimacy); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston,
On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy and the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184,
185 (2013) (seeking to understand the basis for why “Americans ascribe legitimacy to the Court”);
Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts Health Care Decision Disrobed: The
Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 403 (2015) (delving into the
things that change the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy); James L. Gibson & Michael J.
Nelson, Change in Institutional Support for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court’s Legitimacy Imperiled by the
Decision’s It Makes?, 80 PUB. OP. Q. 622, 623–24 (2016) [hereinafter Gibson & Nelson, Change in
Institutional Support] (attempting to explore competing theories that only blockbuster-type cases may
withdraw public diffuse from a theory that every “run-of-the-mill decision . . . is potentially dangerous
to the institution’s health”); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 198 (2011) (providing insight into why
those who know and acknowledge Justices’ application of personal values also extend the most support
to the institution).
13. FALLON, supra note 12, at 21.
14. Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 116 (2003) (focusing
on the moral duty to obey as opposed to sociological or descriptive legitimacy).
15. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 NW. U.L.
REV. 985, 989 (1990).
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that the public understands that the Court is different from the Executive
and Legislative branches of the government and expects the Court to
resolve difficult legal questions through the application of legal tools,
analytical tools, or both. As long as the public believes that the Court is
proceeding in such a manner, it respects the Court and is willing to accept
decisions with which large segments of the public, often a majority, disagree.
In such instances, the Court’s legitimacy is not endangered. However, that
is not always the case. There are certain questions that are simply too big
and too controversial for the Court to resolve even through the application
of “lawyer’s work.” That may have been the case with the appropriate
balance of federal and state authority in the early half of the nineteenth
century: the legal ability of Congress to regulate slavery in the territories and
whether a woman has a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Thus,
Justice Scalia was essentially, though not entirely, correct.
Suppose the Court does lose public approval and hence a degree of
legitimacy—what then? Does a decline or loss of legitimacy mean the rule
of law collapses followed by massive defiance of judicial decisions? History
suggests otherwise. Rather, on several occasions, the Court has gotten out
of step with the public, arguably suffering a crisis of legitimacy. On each
such occasion, the disjunction between the public and the Court has been
corrected through the replacement of dying or retiring Justices, pursuant to
the constitutional check of nomination and confirmation of replacements,
and to a lesser extent by Justices themselves changing their approaches to
interpretation and adjudication.16 In other words, maintaining public
respect and legitimacy has been a concern for the Court throughout its two
hundred-year-plus history. To the extent a judicial legitimacy crisis arises,
the political system provided by the Constitution has provided a remedy;
although, it often takes an extended period of time and gives rise to
significant partisan political fury. This is especially true today with longer
life expectancies, longer tenures of service on the Court, as well as a
reluctance of Justices to permit a President of a different political ideology
to appoint a successor. If the Court is presently in the midst of a legitimacy
crisis—and it is difficult to determine whether that is the case—there is
every reason to believe, both on the basis of history as well he empirical

16. FALLON, supra note 12, at 118 (“If large political majorities dislike the course that the
Supreme Court has charted, electorally accountable presidents will use their powers of appointment to
install Justices who will chart a new course, much as Roosevelt and Nixon did.”).
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research of political scientists, that it will be resolved over time as it has been
in the past.
Crises of legitimacy for the Court are nothing new. Throughout much of
its history, the Court has been at the center of political controversy and yet
it has managed to survive. If anything, the respect for the Court has
increased over time. As Professor Alexander Bickel wrote in the very first
sentence of his classic book The Least Dangerous Branch: “The least dangerous
branch of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful
court of law the world has ever known.”17 As Bickel explained, it hasn’t
always been that way. Rather, the Court has acquired its prestige and public
support over a lengthy period of time. Throughout much of American
history, the Court’s legitimacy has not been in question; however, on
occasion it has. When that has occurred, the Court has been saved as an
institution by the political check of the appointment and confirmation
process. That is, when the Court has gotten sufficiently out of step with the
public, retirements have led to the appointment of new Justices who have
either reversed course or have at least engaged in sufficient retrenchment to
defuse any threat to the Court’s legitimacy.
Throughout much of its history, the Supreme Court has been a subject
of controversy and public and political backlash. Within the very first
decade of the republic, the Constitution was amended to overrule the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,18 permitting a private
citizen to sue a state for money damages absent the consent of the state.19
The Marshall Court’s decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland,20 holding Congress
possessed the authority to charter the Bank of the United States and that a
state could not impose a targeted tax on the Bank’s assets, led to perhaps
the most vigorous political backlash against the Court in the nation’s
history.21 In 1857, the Dred Scott 22 decision, holding that a slave or
descendant of a slave could never be a citizen of the United States or of a
17. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962).
18. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
19. See generally id. at 424 (“[I]f it be allowed, that a State may be sued by a foreigner, why, in the
scale of reason, may not the measure be the same, when the citizen of another State is the
complainant?”).
20. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
21. See generally id. at 408 (“[A] government, intrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted
with ample means for their execution.”).
22. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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state, and that Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in the territories,
inflamed a national controversy that culminated in secession and the Civil
War.23
The approximately forty-year period from the 1890s to 1937, often
characterized as the Lochner era, ended in a political revolt against the
Court, the introduction of President Roosevelt’s Court packing plan, and an
abrupt change in the Court’s interpretive approach. This is often cited as a
stunning example of the Court eventually bowing to political backlash.
The Warren Court engaged in aggressive judicial review attacking school
desegregation, mandating reapportionment of state legislatures, expanding
the rights of the accused, prohibiting prayer in schools, and so much more.
Eventually, the unpopularity of many of these decisions led to a political
backlash which helped propel Richard Nixon to the presidency resulting in
a fairly abrupt change in the composition of the Court.
No decision in history has led to a longer and more sustained challenge
to the Court than the Burger Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.24 Due to the
very nature of the issue of abortion, as well as the Court’s inability to justify
the decision in a legally acceptable manner, five decades after the case was
decided, Roe still remains a flashpoint of controversy looming over the
Court. In deciding Roe, the Court seemed to descend into a maelstrom from
which escape is difficult if not impossible. Arguably, the continuing
controversy surrounding Roe contributed in a significant way to recent
changes in the composition of the Court.
A series of decisions by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, including Bush
v. Gore,25 District of Columbia v. Heller,26 and Citizens United v. FEC,27 have
led to extended grumbling by critics, but have not resulted in sustained
political backlash against the Court. Empirical research suggests that as of
2013, self-identified conservatives held the Court in lower esteem than
liberals despite the fact Republican presidents have appointed a majority of
the Justices.28 This may be attributable to the disappointment of

23. See generally id. at 427 (“The principle of law is too well settled . . . that a court can give no
judgment . . . where it has no jurisdiction; and if . . . it appeared that he was still a slave, the case ought
to have been dismissed.”).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
26. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
27. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
28. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court
Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 194 (2013).
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conservatives in the apparent inability of Republican presidents to alter the
ideological direction of the Court,29 or perhaps to the perception that the
Court is an elite institution aligned against more traditional values held by
the public at large.
Arguably, recent changes in the Court’s composition, and potentially its
interpretive direction, are yet the most recent example of the exercise of a
constitutionally based political check on the Court. This is especially true
given that, as a candidate, Donald Trump made Supreme Court
appointments a crucial issue in his campaign and voters responded
favorably. Consequently, any crisis of legitimacy, if there was one, occurred
prior to the election, not afterwards. In the long run, nothing disturbing has
occurred. History and political science indicate that the Court has a deep
reservoir of public support that it can draw on when it is challenged by those
disappointed with its decisions. Rarely, if ever, do claims of illegitimacy lead
to defiance of or a restructuring of the Court. The general public almost
always continues to respect and support the Court even when it disagrees
with its approach and decisions. Even so, the Court stretches its goodwill
with the public past the breaking point, the constitutionally based political
process exercised through the appointment and confirmation process will
succeed in redirecting the Court.
II. THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY
To begin, it is worthwhile to ask why the Supreme Court and its decisions
matter. Over time, the Court has utilized judicial review, especially through
constitutional interpretation, to resolve many difficult legal, political, and
social issues. Arguably, judicial review, at least as contemplated by the
Marshall Court, was never intended to extend as widely and deeply as it has
in the twentieth and twenty-first century America.30 However, that is water
under the bridge. The Court has employed judicial review broadly and the
public, by and large, has accepted it. For most people, it seems sensible to
have a body that can settle difficult and troubling legal questions. But why
does the public acquiesce to the decision of five Justices even when a large
segment of that public, very often a majority, disagrees with the result?

29. Id.
30. WILLIAM NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 8, 63 (2000); see Michael Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1111, 1121 (2003) (“Marshall simply was evincing his commitment to the prevalent
understanding that judicial review authorized invalidation of only obviously unconstitutional laws.”).
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Discussions of judicial legitimacy usually start by quoting Alexander
Hamilton’s famous remark in Federalist No. 78 that, “[t]he judiciary . . . has
no influence over the purse or the sword . . . [i]t may truly be said to have
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”31 Why then does the
public accept and obey judicial decisions with which it disagrees? The
answer supplied by generations of political scientists and legal scholars is
that the Court relies on its accumulated “moral capital” to ensure
obedience.32 This constitutes the Court’s legitimacy. In other words, to be
effective, at least in a democracy, a governmental institution, including the
Supreme Court, must be perceived by the public as legitimate.33 Otherwise,
it would be ignored. This is especially true with respect to the courts which,
as Hamilton noted, have no direct enforcement power.34 As political
scientists have declared: “Legitimacy is for losers, since winners ordinarily
accept decisions with which they agree . . . .”35 Interviews with Supreme
Court Justices indicate that many are concerned with maintaining public
support and, hence, legitimacy.36 Arguably, at least some Justices are more
influenced by elite opinion than the opinion of the public at large.37
Political scientists who study judicial legitimacy tend to divide the concept

31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 291 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. M’Lean 1788).
32. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in
Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 162, 173 (2014) (“[B]ecause the Court
currently attracts legitimacy from the majority, its ability to rule against the people’s preferences, even
up to one-half or so of the time, is secure.”); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, supra note 15,
at 992 (1990) (“In a political system ostensibly based on consent, the Court’s legitimacy—indeed the
Constitution’s—must ultimately spring from public acceptance, even approval, of its various roles.”);
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 127–28 (1980).
33. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 15, at 992 (1990) (“In a political system ostensibly based
on consent, the Court’s legitimacy—indeed the Constitution’s—must ultimately spring from public
acceptance, even approval, of its various roles.”). The perception of the legitimacy of the Court as an
institution by the public also helps to legitimize the policies which the Court approves. Jeffery J.
Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q.
675, 677 (1994).
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 291 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. M’Lean 1788) (“The
judiciary . . . has no influence over either sword or the purse.”).
35. James L. Gibson et al., Losing but Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory and the Symbols of Judicial
Authority, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 839 (2014).
36. Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI.
971, 973 (2009) (quoting interviews with several unnamed Justices).
37. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares More About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L. REV. 1515, 1528 (2010).
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into diffuse support and specific support.38 Diffuse support focuses on
public approval of the Court as an institution.39 Specific support tends to
focus on whether the public approves or disapproves of a particular decision
or doctrine of the Court, i.e., judicial performance.40 Of the two, diffuse
support is more important since the Court needs to rely on it when specific
support declines. If the Court has sufficient diffuse support it can render
decisions unpopular with a majority of the public without threatening its
legitimacy as an institution.41 Indeed, a study conducted in 2005, by
arguably the preeminent expert on public opinion and the Court, concluded
that the extremely partisan political climate that exists in the country has no
discernable impact on public support for the Court and hence its
legitimacy.42 Research tends to show that the impact of disapproval on
specific decisions may have a short term negative impact on diffuse support
for the Court; however, that effect will dissipate rapidly.43 Yet, a recent
38. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court,
36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992) (“The distinction between diffuse and specific support strikes us
as conceptually sound and intuitively pleasing.”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 32, at 171 (“[T]he Court enjoys a wide and deep ‘reservoir
of goodwill,’ and its supply of institutional support is not overly dependent upon pleasing people on a
day-to-day basis with its decisions.”); Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 38, at 636 (showing the general
public support for the Court is unaffected by the results of particular decisions, however the opinion
of elites is); id., at 643 (“[W]e find no evidence to buttress the argument for a connection between
partisanship and institutional support for the Court.”). But see Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 192
(explaining the conclusion that although there is substantial diffuse support for the Court, persons on
the ideological extremes tend to base their support for the Court on whether they approve of the
Court’s decisions). See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Explaining Diffuse Support for the United
States Supreme Court: An Assessment of Four Models, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 1037, 1042 (1974) (showing
the argument that learning to respect institutions in childhood offers the best explanation for diffuse
support for the Court).
42. See James L. Gibson & Michael Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized
Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL. STUD. 507, 533 (2007) (concluding the legitimacy of the Court survives
even with vast differences in public opinion over decisions); Gibson & Calderia, supra note 12, at 211
(explaining the public appreciates that the Court exercises discretion in a principled manner); Baum &
Devins, supra note 37, at 1548 (“That evidence shows that the Justices have little to fear from a public
that disagrees with its decisions, because its legitimacy is largely impervious to such disagreement.”).
But see David Fontana, How Do People Think About the Supreme Court When They Care, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 50, 51 (2018) (explaining the argument that much of the diffuse support for the Court
accumulates when the public is unconcerned about the Court and its decisions).
43. See Gibson & Nelson, Conventional Wisdoms, supra note 12, at 8–9 (noting one decision will
not have a lasting impact on the public perception of the Court). In a polarized nation, specific
disapproval of decisions tends to be cancelled out by approval by others. Christenson & Glick, supra
note 12, at 416. This suggests that the Court’s legitimacy can best be protected by the practice of

298

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:285

empirical study found the Court’s “overly liberal” decisions has had a
negative effect on the its overall approval rating.44 The recent dispute over
the Court’s legitimacy discussed herein will focus largely on diffuse support
since that is what the Court must rely on when it renders unpopular
decisions.
Presumably, the Court has accumulated a high level of diffuse support
over its two hundred-year-plus history. The Court is not the untested and
possibly feared institution that it was when Hamilton wrote Federalist No. 78.
Political scientists have argued that an important source of the Court’s
diffuse support is the public’s perception that the Court is different from
other institutions of government such as Congress and the President.45 The
Court purports to decide cases, and generally does, through the application
of law as opposed to reaching decisions solely on the basis of policy or value
preference.46 Political scientists refer to this as the “myth of legality,” and
whether they believe the Court is actually making decisions on the basis of
law or whether the Justices are simply using law as a smokescreen to conceal
their policy based decisions, they concede that the public perception of
“legality” provides powerful diffuse support for the Court as an
institution.47 On the other hand, approval or disapproval of the Court
tends to coincide with approval or disapproval of Congress and the
President. This suggests that public opinion of the Court tracks public
opinion of the government in general.48 Even so, the public, while
supporting the Court, recognizes the Justices must inevitably exercise
discretion in deciding cases.49 More educated and informed members of
the public are most likely to believe judicial decisions are based on legal

deciding some cases in favor of each side in an opalized polity. See Grove, supra note 3, at 2262
(discussing this approach).
44. Kathryn Haglin et al., Ideology and Public Support for the Supreme Court, SOCARXIV 1, 28
(Oct. 21, 2018), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/unbmh/ [https://perma.cc/6G2G-895H].
45. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 12, at 214 (asserting judges make decisions within the rule of
law and not upon their own ideological opinions).
46. Id.
47. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme
Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 929 (2000) (“The myth of legality is the belief that judicial decisions are
based on autonomous legal principles . . . [and] is deeply ingrained in American political culture.”).
48. Sofi Sinozich, Public Opinion on the US Supreme Court, 1973–2015, 81 PUB. OP. Q. 175, 179,
185 (2017).
49. See Gibson & Nelson, Conventional Wisdoms, supra note 12, at 20–21 (“[W]hat distinguishes
the judges in the minds of the American people is that the judges exercise discretion in a principled
fashion.”).
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principles.50 Diffuse support for the Court declines if the public concludes
that the Justices are simply making policy or political decisions.51
Justice Scalia recognized this in his dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
which emphasized the essential need for the Justices to decide cases by
“lawyers’ work.”52
That leads to the question of how the Court should respond to concerns
of public dissatisfaction with its work. One approach, perhaps best
identified by the late Alexander Bickel, is that the Court always has, always
will, and always should respond strategically.53 That is, the Court is aware
of its need for general public approval and should and will avoid deciding
cases that will lower its public esteem and hence its moral capital, the key to
its legitimacy. Such a philosophy entails taking a minimalist approach to
constitutional decision-making and avoidance of controversy whenever
possible. Under this approach the Court will make liberal use of the various
avoidance devices, which Bickel characterized as the “passive virtues.”54
The theory is the Court should and will maintain its legitimacy by avoiding
controversy to the extent possible.55 The theory, to a large extent, rests on
the belief that the Court will inevitably behave in a self-protective manner
as virtually any institution would.56 Were the theory accurate in every
respect, the Court would never have decided cases that have resulted in
50. Scheb & Lyons, supra note 47, at 930.
51. See Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has Trump Trumped the Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
32, 35 (2018) (“But, when citizens believe that judicial behavior crosses the line from principled to
politicized, they no longer extend high levels of support to the courts.”).
52. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As long
as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing essentially lawyers’ work
up here—reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public
pretty much left us alone.”).
53. See generally BICKEL, supra note 17 (discussing the relationship between the Court, the law,
and politics); see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 172 (“If the Court is concerned about its own place in
the constitutional order, and wants to maintain its legitimacy and power, it might take account of
outrage as a method of self-preservation.”); Clark, supra note 36, at 973 (highlighting interviews with
some Justices that suggest they do take potential public disapproval into account in rendering
decisions).
54. See generally BICKEL, supra note 17 (discussing a study of the formal techniques for avoidance
of decision, termed “passive virtues”).
55. See Micheal W. Giles et al., The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages
Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293, 303 (2008) (“[T]he strategic behavior
explanation which posits that justices respond strategically to public opinion to protect the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy . . . .”).
56. See generally id. at 303 (2008) (concluding empirical research provides no support for the
theory that Justices engage in strategic decision-making).
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intense political reaction. At the very least, these decisions would be said to
be a result of the Court’s gross underestimation of the strength of
disapproval that these decisions provoked. If the Court always behaved
strategically, there would have been no Dred Scott, no Roe v. Wade, no Lochner
v. New York, no Miranda v. Arizona, and no school prayer cases. If the Court
always behaved strategically, M’Culloch v. Maryland would not have been so
strident and dogmatic. The Court has not always attempted to avoid
political controversy.
There is a different theory of the judicial role perhaps best articulated by
Gerald Gunther in open debate with Alexander Bickel.57 Gunther argued
it is the Court’s duty to decide cases properly brought before it according to
the law with no consideration of the political consequences, even to the
Court itself. In other words, the Court should never employ the avoidance
devices in a manipulative manner for self-protection. Rather, the Court
must decide the cases as the law dictates and let the chips fall where they
may. According to this view, enforcement responsibility rests with the
Executive branch and as such, should not be the Court’s concern even if
lack of enforcement undermines respect for the Court. Both Bickel and
Gunther are partially correct in terms of the Court’s past behavior.
Sometimes the Court has behaved strategically and at other times it has not.
Empirical research suggests that the public respects the Court to a large
extent because it believes the Court behaves more like the model presented
by Gunther than by Bickel.58 Diffuse support for the Court tends to be
based on the view that the Justices decide cases impartially as the law
requires, rather than in a strategic, self-protective manner.59 If the public

57. See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (promulgating a new thesis of the “passive
virtues” in preview and opposition of Bickel’s).
58. See Scheb & Lyons, supra note 47, at 935 (“Americans are more comfortable with a Court
that they perceive to base its decisions on original intent and precedent, rather than on ideology,
partisanship, or pressures from other institutions.”).
59. See id. (positing that though only a quarter of the public believes that the Justices rely
primarily on legal principles in decision-making, this support for the Court would further decline if the
public believed that the Court was making primarily political decisions); Vanessa A. Baird & Amy
Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on
Perceptions of Fairness, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 597, 603 (2006) (“[R]eceiving information that justices bargain
and compromise produces more negative evaluations of Court procedures relative to when the process
is portrayed as guided largely by legal factors.”); Christenson & Glick, supra note 12, at 415 (highlighting
the perceptions of legitimacy decrease most significantly among those who learned that the Court was
influenced by non-legal factors and did not align with their personal ideologies).
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believed the Court was behaving in a manipulative manner, diffuse support
would decline.
Those who favor a strategic self-protective role for the Court can argue
their authority depends on acceptance by the public and as such, the Court
needs to conserve its moral capital for those unusual occasions when they
need to spend it in the face of severe public opposition. If the Court decides
too many cases that are inconsistent with public opinion and values, it will
eventually discover that voluntary compliance with its mandates will
diminish. This position assumes the diffuse support that the Court presently
maintains can be undermined in a significant way. The counterargument is
the Court’s constitutional obligation is to apply the law faithfully, without
concern for the consequences. Alternatively, proponents of this approach
could contend that the Court’s moral capital is great and difficult to exhaust,
and the Justices themselves are ill equipped to estimate whether particular
decisions, or lines of decisions, are likely to diminish the Court’s public
support.
There has been speculation that Chief Justice Roberts’s decisive vote to
uphold the Affordable Care Act was a strategic decision motivated by a
desire to protect the Court from being thrust into the 2012 presidential
campaign.60 Research tends to show that members of the public, upon
being informed that such considerations may have guided the decision,
lowered their opinion of the Court.61 This would seem to present a
paradox. Action taken to preserve the Court’s legitimacy, if so understood
by the public, could actually undermine the very support it is attempting to
preserve.62 This suggests that the Court can appear to decide cases in a
strategic, as opposed to a legalistic manner, only infrequently without
endangering its diffuse support. Moreover, an individual justice’s decision
to behave strategically may turn on an assessment of the likelihood that such
behavior will be recognized by a significant segment of the public. An
evaluation of the breadth and depth of diffuse support, and a calculous of
whether more damage will be done to the Court’s reputation by deciding
60. See MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION
350–51 (2013) (referencing a report by CBS correspondent Jan Crawford discussing the political
influence of Chief Justice Roberts’s vote to uphold the ACA).
61. Christenson & Glick, supra note 12, at 415 (“People who got bad news on both fronts—
that is, read about the non-legal influences on the Court and came to see the Court as less congruent
with their views than they previously believed—exhibited especially large legitimacy losses.”).
62. See Grove, supra note 3, at 2269 (discussing the possibility that actions taken to preserve
legitimacy may in fact lead to its diminishment).
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the case strictly according to law or by deciding it through recognizable
strategic manipulation.
The Court has much more room to behave strategically with respect to
its selection of cases to review than in deciding cases on the merits. This
will certainly be the case given that the Court can only decide a minimal
percentage of the cases filed on the merits, along with the fact the public
will be less aware and less concerned with the cases the Court declines to
hear. Indeed, Professor Alexander Bickel who addressed the strategic
nature of the Court’s decision-making process argued that such strategic
considerations should predominate primarily in docket management.63
Other factors seem to increase the Court’s diffuse support. Some
scholars have argued there is a positivity theory that works in the Court’s
favor.64 Arguably, some of the Court’s diffuse support is attributable to the
public’s belief in and support of American institutions, democracy, the rule
of law, and the need to have an institution that can resolve hard legal
questions.65 In addition, the Court’s symbols—the robes, the majestic
building, the honorary titles by which the Justices are addressed, and the
secrecy—all contribute to the public’s diffuse support.66 All of this leads
to the Court’s legitimacy which seems to have increased over time.
There also appears to be a negativity bias at work because decisions which
a large segment of the public disapprove of seem to reduce support for the
Court to a greater extent than decisions that are met with public approval
which seem to increase public support.67 This is in line with social science

63. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 127–33.
64. Gibson & Nelson, Change in Institutional Support, supra note 12, at 626 (“The magnitude of
the effects of democratic values typically dwarfs the predictive power of all other explanatory
factors . . . .”).
65. See Gibson, supra note 42, at 532–33 (“[L]oyalty toward the institution is grounded in
broader commitments to democratic institutions and processes, and more generally in knowledge of
the role of the judiciary in the American democratic system.”). Even during the war on terror, the
American public remained strongly committed to the rule of law. See James L. Gibson, Changes in
American Veneration for the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 604 (2007) (noting the reluctance of
the American public to allow the government to venture from the rule of law).
66. See Gibson et al., supra note 35, at 838, 859 (positing judicial symbols do not change or
produce attitudes toward the Court but rather activate pre-existing attitudes); Gibson & Nelson, Change
in Institutional Support, supra note 12, at 633 (supporting the conclusion that exposure to judicial symbols
increases acceptance of Court decisions).
67. See Anke Grosskopf & Jeffrey J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court Decisions
Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 51 POL.
RSCH. Q. 633, 636 (1998), https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088042?seq=1 [https://perma.cc/84L4VLEP] (“[R]espondents offered approximately three times more disliked than liked cases when
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research which indicates that negative information has a greater impact on
the recipient than positive information.68 This suggests that the Court
could diminish its standing with the public by issuing a serious of well
publicized unpopular decisions.69 Research suggests that decisions
perceived as liberal have a greater negative impact on the Court than
decisions perceived as conservative.70 Arguably, the Court attempts to
deflect negative bias from itself to the law on which it bases its decisions.71
In other words, the Court seems to say “Don’t blame us. The law made us
do it.”
It should be clear that the general public is not well informed as to the
Court’s interpretive process.72 Many people judge the Court largely, if not
exclusively, on the basis of whether they like the results of the decisions.73
This is hardly surprising. There is no reason to think that the lay public
would be legally sophisticated. Moreover, some empirical research indicates
that legally trained media commentators have little influence whatsoever on
public acceptance of judicial decisions.74 However, there comes a point at
answering open-ended questions about the Court’s actions.”); Gibson, et al., supra note 35, at 840 n.4
(arguing positivity theory and negativity bias are not necessarily in conflict).
68. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 67, at 636 (noting that negative information is weighted
heavier by people and that this might also apply to opinions issued by the Court); JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 134 (1980) (“[N]egative opinions
exercise disproportionate influence in political behavior.”).
69. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 67, at 648.
70. Haglin et al., supra note 44, at 28.
71. James L. Gibson, et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343,
354 (1998).
72. Cf. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 15, at 1019 (showing public acceptance of the Court’s
legitimacy is not dependent on an understanding of the Court’s application of legal principles); David
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 790, 808 (1973) (“[T]he
Supreme Court and its decisions have such low salience as to render improbable popular acceptance
of governmental action because of public knowledge that the policies have been approved by the
justices.”). But see Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 38, at 649 (“Those who are more knowledgeable,
more ‘elite,’ and more active in politics generally show more support for the Supreme Court . . . .”);
James L Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the
High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 439 (2009) (arguing much of the evidence for the thesis that the public is
ignorant of the Court is based on improper survey techniques). Instead, they concluded that
participants in their survey “demonstrate[d] relatively high levels of information about the Supreme
Court.” Id.
73. See Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 197 (“When individuals perceive that they are in
ideological disagreement with the Court’s policymaking, they ascribe lower legitimacy to the Court
compared to individuals who perceive that they are in agreement with the Court . . . .”).
74. See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, The Effect of Legal Expert Commentary on Lay Judgments of
Judicial Decision Making, 10 J. LEGAL EMPIRICAL STUD. 797, 804 (2013) (concluding the public is
influenced by whether respondents personally approve of the result as opposed to whether legal experts
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which even the legally untrained will understand that the Justices have
exceeded the boundaries of accepted legal interpretation. When that
happens, questions as to the legitimacy of the Court may arise.
Apparently, the legal elite hold the Supreme Court in higher esteem than
the public at large, almost unanimously accepting its legitimacy.75 This may
reflect the greater familiarity of the legal elite with the Court, extended
socialization through legal training and practice, and perhaps an aspect of
self-protective behavior in that the legal elite, to a large extent, justifies its
existence and status through the legitimacy of the Court.76 To the extent
that the legal elite disagree with specific decisions of the Court, it tends to
attribute its dissatisfaction to bad decision-making by the particular Court
rather than disapproval of the Court as an institution.77
Recently, as noted above, the concept of legitimacy as applied to the
Supreme Court or to specific decisions of the Court has crept into general
public and media discourse. Partisan political opponents often charge that
the Court as an institution has become “illegitimate” either based on a
specific decision or a group of decisions. To a large extent, the term
illegitimate has become an epithet hurled at political opponents in the hope
of influencing the public. As such, these charges of illegitimacy should be
understood for what they are, simply examples of overheated partisan
political rhetoric which ought not be taken too seriously. This is not the
type of legitimacy generally studied by political scientists unless, of course,
the rhetoric has the desired effect of actually influencing public opinion.
Empirical research confirms that Justice Scalia was correct in recognizing
that public acceptance of the Court and its decisions is grounded in the
public’s understanding that the Court is attempting, in good faith, to decide
difficult legal questions through the employment of accepted methods of
legal interpretation,78 in the words of Justice Scalia, by doing “lawyers’
view the decision as correct). But see Nelson & Gibson, supra note 51, at 39–40 (stating charges of
politicization of judicial decisions by law professors can have a greater impact in lowering respect for
the Court than similar charges by politicians).
75. See Brandon L. Bartels et al., Lawyer’s Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a Political
Institution?, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 761, 764 (2015) (“[P]erceived legitimacy among these legal elites is
extremely high—and much higher than it is for the mass public at large.”).
76. See id. at 765 (describing the characteristics that lead to near unanimous approval of the
Court).
77. See id. at 769 (“For legal elites, the core of institutional legitimacy, which they possess at near
unanimous levels, and perceptions of the Court’s decision making may be separable constructs.”).
78. See FALLON, supra note 12, at 11 (concluding that in order to adjudicate in a legitimate
manner, the Justices must (1) “stay within the bounds of law,” (2) exhibit “reasonable practical and
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work.”79 If the public concluded that the Court was simply deciding cases
on the basis of value judgments or partisan ideology, as opposed to good
faith efforts to apply the law, the Court would lose respect.80 The public
assumes that the Court is not simply deciding cases on a political basis, or
on the basis of the personal values, or on the ideology of the judges and
then providing a legalistic veneer as cover. Rather, it is attempting to resolve
hard legal questions by applying reasoning from pre-existing legal
principles.81 The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey addressed this
explicitly. The Court wrote:
The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit
to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.
The underlying source of this legitimacy is the warrant for the Court’s
decisions in the Constitution and lesser sources of legal principle on which
the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court’s opinions, and
our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled
justification would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is
furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required. Because
not every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as
such, the justification claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take
care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the
terms that the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as
compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing
on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court’s
legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under

moral judgment” and (3) “support their judgments with arguments they advance in good faith”). All
of these conditions would satisfy Justice Scalia’s criteria of “lawyers’ work.” See Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the
public does not negatively view Court decisions when they are perceived to be removed from political
influence); see also Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 194 (“Moderates who perceive the Court as
taking a case-by-case approach to its rulings maintain the highest degree of legitimacy among the
groups examined . . . .”).
79. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the public does not negatively view
Court decisions when they are perceived to be removed from political influence).
80. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and Empowerment of Discretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 705, 783 (1994) (“The data
presented extend this conclusion to the Supreme Court: how decisions are made tends to be more
important to Court legitimacy than what decisions are made.”).
81. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 12 (2d ed. 1994) (“The
Court’s claim on the American mind derives from the myth of an impartial, judicious tribunal whose
duty it is to preserve our sense of continuity with the fundamental law.”).
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circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be
accepted by the Nation.82

The joint opinion stated the case for judicial legitimacy more explicitly than
had ever been done before by the Supreme Court. The irony is that the very
arguments that the joint opinion made for sustaining at least the core of Roe
v. Wade are the exact arguments raised by its critics to argue it was in fact an
unprincipled and hence illegitimate decision.83
However, if the concept is to have any meaning, it must be defined with
greater precision. What if the Court is deemed to be illegitimate? What
then? Does it really matter? To be a meaningful concept, illegitimacy must
mean something more than general disapproval. The Court often decides
difficult questions of great interest to the public, often by a 5–4 vote.
Whether the subject is abortion rights, racial preferences in education,
prohibition of school prayer or same sex marriage, a significant segment of
society will be pleased with the result in these cases and a significant segment
of society will be displeased. To some extent, the pleased and displeased
will cancel each other out.84 That is always the case and the very fact that
many dislike a particular decision or doctrine hardly means that there is a
legitimacy crisis. Rather, for the Court to be considered illegitimate, a
substantial majority of the public must conclude that the Court is so
thoroughly off base, it should be significantly restructured or even
abolished. Otherwise, illegitimacy simply becomes an epithet of strong
disapproval, often grounded in political disagreement. The mere desire to
reshape it when possible through the appointment process, as has been done
82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–66. Based on a detailed empirical study, Tyler and Mitchell concluded
“the findings support the Court’s argument that the willingness of the public to empower the Court to
make controversial decisions such as Casey is related to public perceptions of how Court decisions are
made.” Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 80, at 772. As Robert McCloskey observed, “[t]he judges have
usually known what students have sometimes not known—that their tribunal must be a court, as well
as seem one, if it is to retain its power.” MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 13.
83. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE. L. REV.
920, 936, 943, 947 (1973) (discussing the unconstitutionality of the decision in Roe v. Wade); ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 112 (1990) (“Unfortunately, in the entire opinion there is not
one line of explanation, not one sentence that qualifies as legal argument.”).
84. See MICHAEL J. NELSON & PATRICK D. TUCKER, THE STABILITY AND DURABILITY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S LEGITIMACY 8 (2017) (on file with author) (“[B]ecause the number of
individuals who are pleased with the decision and the number of individuals who are disappointed in
the decision are approximately equal in number, thereby canceling each other out in the aggregate.”);
Herbert M. Kritzer, Into Electoral Waters: The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of
the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 36 (2001) (stating the effect of those who approved of the
decision in Bush v. Gore and those who disapproved cancelled each other out).
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throughout history does not necessarily mean that the Court is illegitimate.
Rather, this suggests the Court has simply grown out of synch with the
public and needs to be redirected. Research shows that despite some
dissatisfaction from time to time with the Court, an overwhelming majority
rejects restructuring, packing, or abolishing.85 There is also the thought that
if the Court were to lose substantial public support, defiance of its mandates
might become routine. The risk that the public might ignore judicial decrees
may have been a viable threat in the first third of the nineteenth century,
before the Court had established its role in the constitutional system and
won the respect of the public. The threat of widespread defiance is now
minimal. The Court simply has too deep of a reservoir of diffuse support
grounded in respect for the rule of law.
By definition, the type of hard questions that come before the Court do
not have obvious legal answers. Justices operating in complete good faith
may reach opposite conclusions through accepted legal analysis. That
should not and generally does not undermine the respect for the law and for
the Court. Nor should it undermine the Court’s legitimacy that a particular
Supreme Court is guided by a particular vision of its role in constitutional
interpretation.86 That has always been the case. The Marshall Court sought
to strengthen the federal government with respect to state authority, to
establish and secure its own role in the constitutional system, and to
encourage business and investment.87 The Taney Court attempted to
consolidate judicial power and preserve the Union.88 The Lochner-era
Court sought to protect private property and business against undue
governmental regulation.89 The Warren Court was interested in expanding
the protection of individual rights as well as the role of the Court. The
Rehnquist Court was dedicated to restoring the concept of federalism. The
Roberts Court may be concerned with minimizing the role of the Court in
policy making. The fact that at any given time, the Court has had a
discernable agenda or bias does not necessarily threaten its legitimacy as a
85. See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a
National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 782 (2012) (“[M]any studies have shown that even in
the face of unhappiness with the Court there is very little support for ‘fundamental structural changes’
to the Court.”).
86. See Nelson & Gibson, supra note 51, at 35 (distinguishing between principled ideologically
based decisions which the public accepts and political decisions which it does not).
87. Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 801
(1975).
88. Id. at 801–02.
89. Id.

308

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:285

judicial institution as long as it is able to achieve its results through the
application of accepted legal reasoning.
At the outset, the joint opinion in Casey recognized that the public
acceptance of the Court’s decisions and thus its legitimacy is dependent on
the belief that it interprets the nation’s laws in a principled manner.90 How
does the Court do that? In his dissenting opinion in the very same case,
Justice Scalia provided the answer arguing that to accept the Court’s
decisions, the public must believe that the Court is doing “lawyers’ work.”91
But that begs the question of what is “lawyer’s work?” Which methods of
analysis are legitimate for judges to employ and which are not? That raises
the question of why we ask judges to resolve legal questions. Presumably,
the answer lies in the assumption that law has meaning which is discoverable
through accepted methods of legal analysis.92 Otherwise, why are judges
any more capable of resolving legal questions than politicians, fortune
tellers, or the public at large.
In Marbury v. Madison,93 the case that gave rise to the principle of judicial
review, at least with respect to acts of a coordinate branch of government,
Chief Justice Marshall endorsed the principle that judges are only authorized
to proceed through the application of legal principles.94 Marshall justified
the exercise of judicial review over acts of Congress as subsidiary to courts’
obligation to decide cases between the parties to litigation through
application of the law. As he noted: “It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”95 According to
Marshall, resolving conflicts through interpretation and application of the
law was “the very essence of judicial duty.”96 Marbury—and consequently
the entire theory of American judicial review—was explicitly based on
courts doing “lawyers’ work,” that is attempting to apply pre-existing legal
90. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992)
(“[C]onsidering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional
integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade
should be retained.”).
91. Id. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Underlying this legal system is the key premise that words, including written laws, are capable of
objective ascertainable meaning.”).
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
94. See id. at 177–78 (proclaiming the judicial department’s duty is to state what the law is and
as part of their duty to “apply the rule to particular cases”).
95. Id. at 177.
96. Id. at 178.
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principles to resolve legal disputes. It was clearly not based on a conception
of the judge identifying and applying unenumerated values or an emerging
consensus. Thus, the conclusion that judicial review in a democracy is
justified at all is based on the assumption, from the very outset, that judges
are resolving the cases before them through the application of legal
principles derived through well-accepted methods of interpretation. Any
other approach would threaten the legitimacy of the Court.
III. WHAT IS LAWYER’S WORK AND
WHY SHOULD THE COURT ENGAGE IN IT?
If the accepted conception of judicial review, which in turn supports the
Court’s legitimacy as an institution, is based on the assumption that the
Court will decide legal disputes through the application of the law, that is,
by doing lawyers’ work, the question then becomes what lawyers’ work is
and what are its proper boundaries.
So, what is lawyers’ work? What are the accepted methods of legal
analysis? What is it that lawyers have been trained to do and how have
judges interpreted the Constitution over the past two centuries?97
A. Textualism
First among these methods is textual analysis. Much of the time, the
Court is attempting to discern the meaning of a written text. Indeed,
Marshall based his case for judicial review in Marbury on the premise that
the framers established a written constitution in order to provide clear
limitations on power and that the written constraints contained in the text
were discoverable by judges through the adjudication of disputes.98 As
such, Marshall privileged textualism as a method of interpretation.99
Indeed, the Marshall Court produced several of the finest examples of
textual analysis including Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition of the

97. See generally LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (providing an analysis of the interpretive
techniques the Court has relied on throughout its history).
98. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176 (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.”).
99. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1136 (1998) (“When a judge goes beyond the meaning of the words that were enacted—to the
unexpressed intentions of the legislature, or to what the courts think would meet the needs and goals
of society—the judge has no democratic warrant. The constitutional text is therefore, the first and
foremost consideration in judging.”).
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Necessary and Proper Clause in M’Culloch v. Maryland,100 his interpretation
of the Interstate Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden,101 as well as
Justice Story’s analysis of Article III in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.102 The
assumption is that words have meaning and the text’s legitimate authors
intended to convey such meaning. However, texts can be ambiguous, and
it is often unclear how the text should apply to uncontemplated
circumstances. There will be room for disagreement among those legally
trained operating in good faith. To aid in the interpretation of a legal text—
be it a constitution, statute, contract, or deed—the courts over time have
adopted various canons of construction to provide guidance.103 The
canons will not resolve every issue but at the least, they will often narrow
the possibilities. When judges engage in good faith textual analysis, they are
doing what lawyers are trained to do. Obviously, well trained judges acting
in good faith can interpret a text and reach different conclusions. That has
happened often in our constitutional history. That does not mean that the
judges are not engaged in lawyers’ work and hence are acting illegitimately.
Rather, it suggests the types of hard cases that the Court often attempts to
resolve do not have easy answers.
An excellent example of two superb Justices reaching different
conclusions as to the meaning of constitutional text is found in District of
Columbia v. Heller.104 There, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
interpreted the text of the Second Amendment as recognizing an individual
right to possess firearms for purposes of self-defense.105 Justice Stevens
dissented, interpreting the text as recognizing only a collective right tied to
service in the now defunct state militias.106 Each justice marshaled
extensive legal support for his respective position. The acceptance of either
position would not have presented a challenge to the legitimacy of the Court
as an institution. Rather, it was an example of the Court, at its finest, simply
doing lawyers’ work in a challenging case. While most cases the Court
decides today do not involve close interpretation of constitutional text, there
are many examples of careful textual analysis throughout the Court’s
100.
101.
102.
103.

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (discussing the legal canons of interpretation in depth).
104. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
105. Id. at 627–29.
106. Id. at 636–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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history.107 For instance, in The Pocket Veto Case,108 the Court interpreted
the word “days” in Article I Section 7 to mean legislative days and the word
“adjournment” as not limited to final adjournments. In Hawke v. Smith,109
the Court interpreted the word “legislature” in Article 5 to mean a
representative body of the people authorized to make laws as opposed to a
popular referendum. In City of Boerne v. Flores,110 the Court read the word
“enforc[ing]” in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to effectuate the
substantive provisions of the Amendment rather than change its
meaning.111 In Plyler v. Doe,112 the Court understood the phrase “persons
within its jurisdiction” in the Fourteenth Amendment to mean, as it seemed,
physically as opposed to legally present.113 These are all examples of judges
interpreting a legal text, the Constitution, as lawyers are trained to do. Texts
often are subject to alternative interpretations. The majority may not always
reach the correct result. But as long as it proceeds in a careful, lawyerly
interpretive manner, erroneous conclusions do not threaten the Court’s
legitimacy. However, textual analysis can cross the line if the judge is acting
disingenuously and construing the text to mean something it clearly couldn’t
mean. If carried on repeatedly, this might cast doubt on the Court’s
legitimacy. Or it might also suggest that certain judges were simply bad
lawyers.
B. Original Understanding
One significant related aspect of textual interpretation is original
understanding. Assuming that words have meaning, one method of
resolving that meaning is to attempt to learn what the public understood the
words to mean at the time of their adoption. Sometimes, it will not be
possible to discover the original understanding of the text. Sometimes that
understanding will not resolve contemporary legal issues. But sometimes it
will be very helpful. And if the original understanding of text is clear, it
provides a powerful interpretive argument. At the very least it may eliminate
certain interpretations that are clearly inconsistent with the original
107. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 287 (1866) (reading the phrase “bill of attainder” in
Article I broadly).
108. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679–80 (1929).
109. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
110. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
111. Id. at 519–20.
112. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
113. Id. at 211–15.
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understanding.114 Just as Heller was an excellent example of textual analysis,
it was also one of the finest examples of an attempt to discover the original
understanding in the United States Reports by both Justice Scalia and
Justice Stevens. Original understanding is a powerful legal argument. It
makes sense.115 No competent lawyer or judge would ignore it if it would
aid their position. Likewise, to the extent it undermines their position, it
would be a great mistake to simply ignore it. There has been a revival of
interest in original understanding methodology since Judge Bork, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas began to emphasize it over the past forty
years.116 More historical material shedding light on the original
understanding of constitutional language is available to lawyers and judges
than has ever before. More lawyers and judges have been trained in the
competent understanding and usage of this material. There is every reason
to believe that serious originalism-based arguments will increase in the
future.
C. Precedent and Doctrine
Our legal system has developed along a common-law path, meaning
precedent and doctrine play a major role.117 Reliance on precedent furthers
legal efficiency by keeping courts from continually needing to reinvent the
wheel. Over time, precedent becomes almost as authoritative as statutory
or constitutional text.118 However, courts recognize that they sometimes
decide incorrectly, so there is room for the overruling of precedent. But this
is very much the exception. There is a strong presumption in favor of
precedent. Precedent may be interpreted broadly or narrowly and there is
room to argue it is inapplicable to the present controversy. Arguing about
the applicability of precedent is quintessential lawyers’ work.
114. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 U. VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987) (noting the
first step that is often ignored by originalists is to see the clear original understanding).
115. See FALLON, supra note 12, at 48 (“[E]veryone agrees that original meaning matters
sometimes.”).
116. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (emphasizing
the role originalism has played in constitutional interpretation).
117. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (Brian Garner
ed. 2016) (providing pertinent information on the role precedent plays in the United States’ legal
system); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008) (discussing how precedent is
used as persuasion in arguing cases).
118. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
precedent should never be equated with the status of the text and that the Court should be prepared
to overrule clearly erroneous precedent).

2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS?

313

Quite apart from precedent, there is doctrine. In areas in which cases
arise with frequency, the Court creates legal doctrine to provide guidance
both to itself and to lower courts and primary decision-makers. Some
doctrine sets forth rules of analysis such as standards of review in particular
areas. Other doctrine embodies substantive rules of law. Doctrine plays the
important role of injecting a degree of consistency and predictability into
the law. Doctrine helps to render legal decision-making law-like rather than
wholly ad hoc. By providing a degree of clarity to the law, doctrine avoids
the litigation of every case by informing parties and counsel in advance of
the likely results if litigation proceeds. The creation of doctrine is necessary
to the efficient operation of a precedent-based legal system; however, it
always raises the concern that doctrine will assume a life of its own and stray
from the primary sources of text, original understanding, and precedent
from which it is derived. Engaging in doctrinal analysis is at the very heart
of modern constitutional decision-making. It is what judges and lawyers do,
what they are expected to do, and what they are trained to do. It is at the
very core of “lawyers’ work.” As with the other methods of analysis, there
is much room for plausible disagreement over how doctrine should be
interpreted.
D. Structure
Yet another accepted method for gleaning constitutional meaning is
structural analysis. That is, attempting to derive constitutional principles
from the structure of the Constitution and the nature of the government it
creates. Structural analysis played a very important role in early Marshall
Court decisions, at a time when the Court was writing on a relatively blank
slate. M’Culloch v. Maryland has been justly cited as the case that embodies
structural analysis at its finest and which has since justified structural analysis
as a legitimate method of constitutional interpretation.119 In M’Culloch,
Marshall relied on constitutional structure to establish broad powers of
Congress to choose appropriate means to execute its great enumerated
powers and to establish that a state could not constitutionally impose a
targeted tax on a federal instrumentality.120 However, structural analysis is
119. See CHARLES J. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4
(1969) (using M’Culloch as the paradigm example of the legitimacy and power of structural argument).
120. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406, 411–16 (1819) (concluding the word
necessary in the phrase “laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers” as being intended to “insure, as far as human prudence could insure, [such powers]
beneficial execution”).
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not simply a remnant of the Marshall Court. More recently, the Court has
relied on constitutional structure in cases involving questions of
federalism.121 As with other accepted methods of interpretation, structure
is subject to very different visions and hence results. Indeed, in M’Culloch v.
Maryland itself, the challengers propounded a very different conception of
constitutional structure than did Chief Justice Marshall writing for a
unanimous court.122 As with the other accepted methods of interpretation,
the very fact of disagreement, especially in hard cases, does not undermine
the legitimacy of the methodology. In hard cases by definition, the law is
unclear and good lawyers, doing lawyers’ work, will make divergent
arguments, and the courts, hopefully in good faith, will draw conclusions
and resolve the disputes. That is how the legal system proceeds.
E. Tradition and History
There are certain areas in which the Court has placed reliance on tradition
and history as a method for discovering constitutional meaning. This is
particularly true in the area of separation of powers, where alternative modes
of analysis may provide little guidance. Perhaps the most noted example of
this is Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer123 where he wrote “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution,
making it as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power . . . .’”124
Tradition and history has also played a role in the Establishment Clause area,
where the longstanding recognition and support for a practice, such as
legislative prayer, has been a factor—though generally not the exclusive or
definitive factor—establishing its constitutionality.125
121. See generally, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (interpreting the
Constitution by using its structure to determine the legal questions presented).
122. Maryland’s conception of constitutional structure gave precedence to the states over the
federal government contrary to Marshall’s vision.
123. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
124. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
125. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (“From colonial times through the
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. In the very courtrooms in which the United
States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the proceedings opened
with an announcement that concluded, ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court.’ The
same invocation occurs at all sessions of this Court.”).
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Reliance on tradition and history is well accepted in constitutional
interpretation; however, it is a slippery methodology easily subject to
manipulation.126 It may be difficult to establish a particular practice or
tradition. There may be room for a choice between competing traditions.
There will be questions as to whether a particular historical tradition is
sufficiently analogous to the question at hand. There may be questions as
to whether the tradition is sufficiently worthy of being sustained. There is
also a question as to the level of abstraction at which a tradition should be
defined, which in a particular case may be outcome determinative.127 Still,
a careful and discerning Justice may draw useful constitutional meaning
from a longstanding tradition as Justice Scalia noted in his Planned Parenthood
dissent, interpreting constitutional traditions is well recognized lawyers’
work.
F. The Tools of the Lawyer’s Trade
Text, original understanding, precedent, doctrine, constitutional
structure, and tradition and history have been identified as legitimate means
of constitutional interpretation. Why are these methodologies preferred?
The answer is because they are the tools of the legal trade and because they
have been accepted as legitimate throughout most of our constitutional
history. The trust in the Supreme Court (and lower courts) to resolve
constitutional disputes is based on the expectation that it will do so through
the application of the law in good faith. In applying the law, it is assumed
by the public, the legal community, and the Justices themselves that they are
in fact resolving disputes according to law and they are deriving that law
through accepted interpretive methodologies, as opposed to simply deciding
cases based on their own ideologies, value preferences, or their conception
of society’s emerging consensus. As long as Justices employ these wellaccepted methodologies, the Court as an institution will continue to retain
respect even though large segments of the public disagree intensely with
particular decisions derived through lawyerly analysis. Rather, it is when the
Court clearly departs from accepted methods of analysis and decides
significant issues based on no discernable form of legal analysis that the
Court’s institutional reputation is endangered.

126. See generally BLOOM, supra note 97, at 133–67.
127. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (showcasing debate between
Justices Scalia and Brennan).
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A response to this argument is that perhaps over time, more ad hoc nonlegalistic interpretation, sometimes characterized as “non-interpretivism,”
has gained favor with some of the Justices and the public and has come to
be accepted.128 Sometimes this is characterized as a “living Constitution”
approach.129 As such, if free form, result-oriented judging was not initially
accepted, perhaps it has become accepted over time. To a large extent, legal
academics, well aware of the inherent weakness of certain decisions that they
revere, especially Roe v. Wade, have attempted to justify such non-legalistic,
value-based, result-oriented judging.130 In its simplest form, this is an ends
justifies the means argument.
There are at least three answers to this claim. First, with only a few
prominent counterexamples such as abortion rights and same-sex marriage,
the Court tries very hard to justify its decisions with traditionally accepted
interpretative methodologies. The cases in which the Court is unable to
offer such justification are clearly the exceptions or outliers, though they are
significant. Both through their decisions and through their statements
pertaining to the nature of their work, the Justices themselves purport to
believe that they are deciding cases by doing lawyers’ work and should be
doing just that.
Second, quite apart from judicial behavior, reliance on the well-accepted
tools of the legal and judicial craft is the only approach that squares with the
very justification for judicial review—the reason why legally trained judges
are entrusted with interpreting the law and most particularly the
Constitution. As Justice Scalia was known to believe, if the Court cannot
resolve a case through the application of interpretive methods designed to
clarify pre-existing legal principles, it has no business proceeding. Diffuse
public support for the Court, hence its legitimacy, is largely based on the
public’s perception that the Court is different from the political branches
128. Cf. FALLON, supra note 12, at 88 (“American constitutional law is a practice in this sense,
constituted by the shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept the
constitutional order and participate in constitutional argument and adjudicative practices.”). In other
words, the participants in the game make the rules as they proceed. See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 39 (1991) (“[W]hat counts as a plausible legal argument does indeed
change, and change profoundly, over time.”).
129. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (arguing against
Justice Scalia’s method of interpreting the Constitutions as the framers would have understood it).
130. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703
(1975) (examining the controversial assertion that Justices might should apply “principles of liberty and
justice when” reviewing laws for constitutionality); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1975) (noting the Court is deviating from an Originalist application when making its decision).
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because it attempts to decide cases in good faith through application of law
rather than values, ideology, or policy preferences.
Third, acceptance of unconstrained judging becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. If it is appropriate for the Court to ignore accepted methods of
legal interpretation in one case, both the Justices and the informed public
will assume that it will be appropriate as well in the next case that presents
a desired result with no accepted legal basis. This has the potential to lead
the Court away from constrained decision-making in a vast array of cases,
endangering the Court’s legitimacy and its role in the constitutional system.
Under such an approach, the Court would be especially subject to political
manipulation. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, judicial confirmation hearings would degenerate into inquisitions
focused on potential substantive results rather than the limits of
interpretation.131
There is no question that the public at large is uninformed about judicial
methodology and either approves or disapproves of decisions based
primarily on the result.132 Nevertheless, there are limits to public ignorance
or apathy with regard to the Court’s interpretive approach. At least a
significant segment of the public will lose respect for the judiciary when the
issue in question really matters (as abortion does), and the Court’s decision
is transparently devoid of adequate legal support. At that point, many will
conclude that the Court has strayed well beyond its legitimate boundaries
and entered the world of partisan politics. In that event, a segment of the
public would support the decisions because they are deeply committed to
the result and assume that it is the duty of the Court to deliver results that
they consider fair and just, at least on matters that they really care about.
However, another significant segment of the public will cling to the
assumption that it is the proper role of the Court only to decide cases on
the basis of law and if the law fails to support a decision, then it is not the
Court’s business to decide.
Consequently, non-legalistic or noninterpretivist judging will all but inevitably lead to political controversy with
respect to the Court.
Even when the Court applies these time-honored methodologies of
interpretation, there will be room for much play in the joints and in
131. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 15, at 990 (“[W]e suspected—correctly, it turned
out—that only a small portion of the general public would have a sophisticated understanding of the
Court.”).
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politically controversial cases including Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,133 and District of Columbia v. Heller,134 as well as cases involving
hot-button issues such as racial preferences in college admissions135 or
public school graduation prayer.136 Plausible arguments can be made in
favor of one result or the opposite. The very fact that hard legal questions
are difficult and fail to yield a unanimous conclusion should not undermine
the Court’s legitimacy as long as the Justices are attempting to decide the
questions through a good faith attempt to apply the law using well-accepted
interpretive techniques.
In addition to proceeding in a more lawyer-like manner, the Court should,
and hopefully will, be more cautious in determining what type of cases it can
resolve in a principled manner—perhaps reinvigorating the political
question doctrine as a protective device. The Court must ensure that its
interpretation and decision-making does no more than professionally
trained lawyers are capable of doing. If the Court follows that approach,
will everyone be happy and rally to the Court’s defense? Of course not.
There is a significant constituency that has urged the Court to do justice
regardless of the law and applauded the Court when it has complied. As
noted above, this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If there is a segment
of the population that expects the Court to resolve controversial political
issues in a manner which that segment favors with little if any legal support
and the Court does so, an even greater segment of the public will come to
accept such judicial over-reaching as the Court’s proper role. It is only by
pursuing a more restrained approach over a lengthy period of time (perhaps
133. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
134. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) (“The two sides in this case have set
out very different interpretations of the Amendment. Petitioners and today’s dissenting Justices believe
that it protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service.
Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in
a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”
(internal citation omitted)).
135. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 (2016) (upholding the University of Texas
at Austin’s admissions policy based in a limited manner on race for the purpose of increasing racial and
ethnic diversity); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 310–11 (2013) (clarifying no deference is owed
when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve a university’s permissible
goals); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (deciding a school’s use of race as a factor among
many other factors is constitutional); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51 (2003) (holding
application of race in mechanical manner such as through an admissions equation is unconstitutional).
136. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (deciding whether “clerical members who
offer prayers” during a “graduation ceremony is consistent with the . . . First Amendment” and
Fourteenth Amendment).
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decades) that the Court can reestablish—both for the Justices themselves
and hopefully a majority of the public—the appropriate role of the Court in
the constitutional system. But there will be a segment of the public,
especially among legal academics, who will never be convinced and who will
continue to rail for a return to the days when the Court could be expected
to come to the rescue and deliver otherwise unachievable political
victories.137 For these critics, the Court’s return to a lawyers’ work judicial
system will evoke cries of illegitimacy.
IV. IS THE SUPREME COURT ALWAYS INVOLVED IN A
CONTINUING CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY?
Arguments have been raised that the Supreme Court is facing a crisis of
legitimacy capable of destroying the Court as a credible institution. These
claims come from opposite directions. Some, including certain Justices on
the Court,138 have claimed over the past several decades that the
substantive due-process-based decision in Roe v. Wade—together with the
Court’s vigorous defense of the decision—has threatened the Court’s
legitimacy because the decision has never been adequately defended or
justified by accepted legal principles or interpretive methods. On the other
hand, defenders of Roe and the ad hoc value-oriented approach that it
represents, faced with the possibility of serious judicial retrenchment have
argued that any movement away from Roe and its jurisprudential approach
will threaten the Court’s legitimacy with the public. Thus, the Court finds
itself at the center of a fierce partisan political battle over its role in our
constitutional system with each side predicting doom should the other side
prevail. Is this unusual? Is there a basis for serious concern?
In fact, the Court has been at the center of political controversy from
time to time throughout constitutional history. Even when the public and
political backlash against the Court has been most severe, the Court as an
institution has managed to survive and retrieve public support through the
constitutionally based political checks on the Court. The President has
appointed, and the Senate has confirmed, new Justices to replace those who
have died or retired. The newly appointed Justices change the direction of
137. BORK, supra note 83, at 252 (noting “professors . . . state a preference for talented and
benevolent autocrats [federal judges] over the self-government of ordinary folk.”).
138. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“I am appalled by[] the Court’s suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an
erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced—against overruling, no less—by the
substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated.”).
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the Court by pulling back from decisions that led to the crisis. Over time,
the Court recovers its “moral capital” with the public. Often, the crisis was
prompted by the perception that the Court had decided or was deciding
cases that were beyond its legitimate capacity to decide at least on a legally
principled basis. In other instances, the crisis was prompted by severe
disagreement with decisions that were justified by accepted methods of
analysis. In either case, when the Court gets too far out of step with public
perceptions giving rise to a crisis of legitimacy, it will retreat to save itself.
That seems to be happening in the present instance as well. But in order to
evaluate the current crisis, it is useful to look to the past.
A. Chisholm v. Georgia—The Court’s First Big Misstep
The history of the Court is that it has frequently been at the center of a
political storm. In the earliest days of the nation, the Court in Chisholm v.
Georgia139 created a political controversy by deciding that states were not
immune from damage suits in federal courts by a citizen of another state.
Traditional legal arguments were raised both in support of and in opposition
to the decision.140 The decision was met with “a gale of opposition from
all sides”141 leading to the prompt enactment of the Eleventh Amendment
reversing the decision in record time. This occurred at a time when the
federal court system, especially the Supreme Court, was viewed with great
skepticism. It was prior to the time when Chief Justice Marshall succeeded
in earning respect for the Court as an institution. There is no possibility that
an unpopular constitutional decision could be reversed by constitutional
amendment with this alacrity in the present time. No matter what the
current Court might do, it would have its defenders who would fight for it
in the political process. Still, it is a reminder that the Court found itself in a
state of crisis from the very outset. However, at the time of Chisholm—only
five years after the Constitution had been ratified—the Court was a fledgling
institution still feeling its way.
139. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
140. At the time, the Court delivered its decisions seriatim rather than with a single Justice writing
for the majority. Justices Blair and Cushing supported the decision with textual arguments. Justices Jay
and Wilson also joined the majority placing primary reliance on policy and history. Justice Irdell
dissenting argued that Article III was not self-executing and Congress had not provided jurisdiction
for a damage action against a state by a non-citizen. See generally id. (providing diverging opinions on
the Constitution’s restrictions).
141. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 22.
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B. McCulloch v. Maryland—The Great Backlash
Chief Justice Marshall, generally considered the greatest of all Justices,
began his lengthy term as Chief Justice with the important opinion in
Marbury v. Madison.142 Marbury is heralded today as the case which first
recognized judicial review over acts of Congress. This aspect of the case
was not particularly controversial even at the time. Instead, it was Marshall’s
assumption that the Court had the authority, at least in limited
circumstances, to oversee decisions of the Executive branch that so
disturbed President Jefferson.143 This complaint may have bothered the
political elites but did not resonate with the general public.
Rather, it was M’Culloch v. Maryland,144 sometimes described as the
Supreme Court’s greatest decision,145 that set off one of the most severe
firestorms that the Court has ever weathered. In his classic opinion in
M’Culloch, Marshall upheld the authority of Congress to create and reauthorize the Bank of the United States and to establish a constitutional
principle prohibiting targeted taxation of a federal instrumentality. M’Culloch
strengthened the authority of the federal government at the expense of the
states. Along the way, Marshall endorsed the popular sovereignty theory of
constitutional origin over the compact theory favored by advocates of state
sovereignty.146 M’Culloch led to perhaps the most ferocious political
backlash that the Court has ever faced.147 As one commentator has noted,
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
143. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 264–65 (rev.
ed. 1922).
144. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402–05 (1819).
145. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 122 (1996) (stating “MCulloch ranks among the greatest of Marshall’s opinions”); MCCLOSKEY,
supra note 81, at 53 (notating how M’Culloch was “the greatest decision John Marshall ever handed
down”); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL DEFINER OF A NATION 441 (1996) (expressing
“MCulloch v. Maryland may be the most important case in the history of the Supreme Court”).
146. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 402–05.
147. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1st ed.1987) (stating “[i]n
the South and old Northwest the Court’s opinion evoked violent criticism”); RICHARD E. ELLIS,
AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM 10–11 (2007) (asserting M’Culloch led to a reaction against both the Bank
and the Court which were considered “aggressive, intrusive and coercive”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE 83 (2009) (“From the time of [M’Culloch] forward the Court was under almost
constant fire.”); HOBSON, supra note 145, at 117 (acknowledging the decision “provoked harsh public
censure in the months following its announcement”); MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V.
MARYLAND SECURING A NATION 141–58 (2006) (detailing a discussion of the reaction against
M’Culloch recognizing that the reaction was “indeed different” from the negative reaction against other
nationalist-oriented Marshall Court decisions); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 299 (2000) (noting how M’Culloch unleashed a “no holds
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“[f]or perhaps most of the public, the Court’s decision appeared
revolutionary.”148 Part of the backlash against the Court is attributable to
the result of the case that upheld the wildly unpopular Bank of the United
States which was widely blamed for credit policies that contributed to the
recession existing at the time.149 Beyond that however, M’Culloch was quite
correctly understood as the Court entering the continuing and often vitriolic
argument over the proper relationship between the national government
and the states with the Court clearly throwing its weight behind the national
government.150 Justice Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee151 prior
to M’Culloch and Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia152 subsequent to
M’Culloch both of which endorsed Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the
highest court of a state (in both instances Virginia) also fueled the fire of
backlash against the Court.153
Marshall’s opponents in Virginia, especially Judge Spencer Roane of the
Virginia Court of Appeals, launched an attack on M’Culloch through a series
of essays published in newspapers.154 This attack alarmed Marshall to the
extent of causing him to respond in a series of pseudonymous essays
published under the name “A Friend of the Constitution.” The reaction to
M’Culloch was not limited to a debate in the press, however. Over the next
decade in response to M’Culloch, Congress seriously considered limiting the
barred debate on the Court, the Constitution, and the Union”). Id. at 332 (stating “Marshall was caught
off balance by the vehemence of the attack on his opinion and on him personally”); WARREN, supra
note 143, at 504, 514 (explaining how the decision in M’Culloch was met with an outburst of indignation
and even actual defiance though disapproval of the decision was largely in the South and West). Id.
at 504–525 (identifying quotations from the press condemning and sometimes praising the decision);
see also JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS; VINDICATED (1820)
(arguing against Marshall’s analysis in M’Culloch).
148. BRAY HAMMOND, QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 39 (John A.
Garraty ed., 1st ed. 1987).
149. Id. at 518–19.
150. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 335 (M’Culloch became the “cause celebre” of the defenders
of state rights).
151. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
152. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
153. See Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 380–81 (noting there is an “absolute necessity . . . for . . . a
revising power over cases and parties in the state courts . . . .”); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 416–17
(emphasizing the framers’ intent to “strengthen[] the confederation by enlarging the powers of the
government, and by giving efficacy to those which it before possessed, but could not exercise”).
154. See GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND
1–21 (1969) (collecting historic essays attacking M’Culloch and the Court as well as Marshall’s replies);
see also ELLIS, supra note 147, at 381 (documenting the discussion of the exchange). At least in private
correspondence, Thomas Jefferson was also a severe critic of the Court in the wake of M’Culloch.
SMITH, supra note 145, at 155–56.
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Court’s jurisdiction.155 The Virginia legislature passed a resolution
condemning the decision.156 State officials blatantly defied the decision
forcing the Court to reaffirm it in Osborne v. United States.157 As one
historian has noted, “M’Culloch set in motion the forces of state rights that
charted the direction of antebellum history.”158 Andrew Jackson
successfully ran for President in large part in opposition to the Bank and the
Marshall Court.159 He vetoed the re-authorization of the Bank, in part
based on his constitutional disagreement with M’Culloch.160 Eventually, he
abolished the Bank by ordering his Secretary of the Treasury to remove all
deposits by the United States from it.161 A movement arose to bring a case
before the Court in an attempt to persuade it to overrule M’Culloch; however
it did not materialize.162 Marshall’s endorsement of the popular sovereignly
theory of constitutional origin over the competing compact theory may have
prevailed in the courts as of M’Culloch, but it took a civil war for that theory
to become truly embodied in the public conception of constitutional
origin.163 Moreover, M’Culloch’s conclusions as to the expansive breadth of

155. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 381 (indicating how M’Culloch and the ensuing debate in the
press gave rise to an “outpouring of measures for curbing judicial power” and among the measures
debated in Congress were proposals to give the Senate final authority over all constitutional cases
involving the issue of federalism or to create a court of the Chief Justices of all of the states to resolve
such issues). The attack on the Court culminated in John Calhoun’s nullification proposal. See id.
at 382–84 (providing an overview of the legislative backlash from M’Culloch). The Court’s defenders
in New England, especially through Joseph Storey’s Commentaries on the Constitution, defended the Court
against the assault. Id. at 384.
156. WARREN, supra note 143, at 518–19.
157. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 867–68 (1824), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332 (“[T]he Court adheres to its decision in the case of [M’Culloch] against The State of
Maryland, and is of opinion, that the act of the State of Ohio, which is certainly much more
objectionable than that of the State of Maryland, is repugnant to a law of the United States, made in
pursuance of the [C]onstitution, and, therefore, void.”).
158. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 375.
159. KILLENBECK, supra note 147, at 167–68.
160. ELLIS, supra note 147, at 214–15; KILLENBECK, supra note 147, at 177–79 (“[T]he heart
of Jackson’s veto was clearly his attempt to minimize the role and influence of the Court, and his
position represented a stark challenge to its authority.”).
161. ELLIS, supra note 147, at 214–15.
162. KILLENBECK, supra note 147, at 177–79.
163. The South seceded on the basis of the compact theory. Lincoln fought the war under the
mantle of popular sovereignty, i.e., the Union was formed by the people, not the states, and thus the
states could not secede. Following the war, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed Marshall’s popular
sovereignty theory. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726–27 (1869), overruled by Morgan v. United States,
113 U.S. 476 (1855) (stating actions ratified by the Legislature and citizens of Texas, such as the
ordinance of secession, “were absolutely null” as the war was fought “for the suppression of rebellion”
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congressional power eventually prevailed as well, but only after both the
Civil War and the New Deal Crisis of 1937.
M’Culloch, as well as some of the Marshall Court’s other decisions favoring
the national government over the states, created a political reaction against
the courts. Five of the seven Justices who joined the unanimous opinion in
M’Culloch had been appointed by either President Jefferson or
President Madison—the political opponents of Chief Justice Marshall
nationalist-oriented approach.164 However, as has often been the case,
when the Court got out of step with public opinion, the political process—
gradually through the appointment and confirmation power, especially the
six Supreme Court appointments by President Jackson which included the
replacement of Marshall as Chief Justice with Roger Taney—ultimately
altered the direction of the Court, especially with respect to questions of
federalism.165 The new majority on the Court was appointed for the
purpose of changing the Court’s direction and did just that.166 One of
Marshall’s last major decisions, Worcester v. Georgia,167 was effectively
ignored by President Jackson, Congress, and the State of Georgia.168 The
popular tide had clearly turned against the Court.
The crisis provoked by M’Culloch is distinguishable from subsequent
crises surrounding the Court. Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in
M’Culloch is an extraordinary example of traditional legal analysis at its
finest.169 Indeed, it provides one of the Court’s most compelling models
of a great justice doing “lawyers’ work.” Nevertheless, the Court provoked
rather than that of conquest; that their obligation and allegiance to the Constitution remained whether
faithful or unfaithful).
164. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 385 (indicating the Court survived “the anti-Court
movement of the 1820s and early 1830s” by trimming its sails and by the fact that its opponents
eventually gained control through the appointment and confirmation process). Id. at 412 (reporting
the Marshall Court began a political retrenchment of its more controversial decisions prior to the Taney
Court).
165. R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 92–93 (2d
ed. 2006) (“President Jackson brought the Supreme Court into harmony with Jacksonian Democracy
by virtue of six appointments.”).
166. NEWMYER, supra note 147, at 377.
167. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
168. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 83–95 (describing the conflicts related to some of the
Court’s decisions, and that during this period, state officials often defied the Court).
169. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 22 (2012) (“To read
[M’Culloch] is to behold the art of constitutional interpretation at its acme.”). However, critics of
Marshall and M’Culloch have argued the decision was more political than legal. See HOBSON, supra
note 145, at 115 (noting the criticism). But see id. at 116 (illustrating Hobson himself rejects the critics
take on M’Culluch).
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a crisis of legitimacy by attempting to authoritatively resolve by judicial edict
the most volatile political issue of the day. No matter how persuasive
Marshall’s legal reasoning might have appeared either at the time or at
present when his vision has largely prevailed, he was attempting to resolve
a controversy that could ultimately only be resolved politically, not judicially.
As such, Marshall’s opinion in M’Culloch provoked extreme political
backlash against the Court, not because Marshall lacked solid legal support
for his decision but rather because the issue was simply too big and too
controversial for the Court to resolve, no matter how skilled its
Chief Justice.
Some have argued that M’Culloch established “the Court’s legitimacy as a
final arbiter of constitutional questions,” though others have disagreed
vigorously.170 The controversy provoked by M’Culloch was created not by
Marshall’s interpretive methods but rather by the result he reached and to
some extent by the unnecessarily provocative and dogmatic tone of the
opinion. Not far from the surface was the fear of critics in the South that
Marshall’s deference to a sweeping view of congressional power would
eventually be employed to challenge slavery or at least its expansion.171 In
the context existing at the time, virtually any judicial attempt to define the
appropriate boundaries between federal and state power, a legitimate
question for the Court to address both then and now was likely to result in
public controversy and perhaps political challenge to the Court. Marshall
simply went too far, too fast, and too stridently on an issue of which the
nation was deeply divided, subjecting the Court to a severe but legitimate
constitutional check.
C. The Taney Court and the Dred Scott Debacle
When Taney replaced Marshall as Chief Justice in 1835, the supporters of
the nationalist-oriented Marshall Court concluded both the Court and the
Constitution were doomed.172 For two decades, however, the postMarshall Taney Court maintained a low profile and avoided public
controversy, but that changed with the overheated debate concerning
congressional authority over slavery in the territories preceding the Civil

170. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815–1835,
at 749 (1991) (asserting M’Culluch helped the perception of the Court’s importance).
171. LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 604 (1974); PETER CHARLES
HOFFER ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 70 (2007).
172. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 53.
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War.173 The understanding was if a territory was authorized to permit
slavery, it would probably enter the Union as a slave state and vice versa. It
was crucial to the South to maintain somewhat of a balance between slave
and free states to avoid creating a supermajority of free states capable of
amending the Constitution to prohibit slavery. By the 1850s, this issue was
tearing the nation apart. In the Dred Scott case, widely considered the Court’s
gravest error, the Court attempted to provide a constitutionally based
judicial resolution to the question.174 In that case, Scott, a slave, sued for
his freedom because he had lived with his master, an army physician, in the
free state of Illinois and the free territory of Upper Louisiana before being
returned to slavery in Missouri. The Court attempted the impossible. By
throwing its weight and prestige behind the slave-holding South in a
disingenuous and poorly reasoned opinion, the Court only made matters
worse, damaging its own reputation in the process. The Dred Scott case did
not cause the Civil War; it almost certainly would have occurred in any
event.175 However, it did make a very bad situation even worse.
There were two holdings in Dred Scott. First, a three Justice plurality held
that a slave or a descendant of a slave could be neither a citizen of a state
nor the United States.176 As a result, Scott could not sue in federal court
under diversity of citizenship, and the Court dismissed his lawsuit for lack
of jurisdiction. Perhaps even more provocative, a six-Justice majority held
that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories because it would
violate the (substantive) due process rights of the slave owner by effectively
depriving him of his property on venturing into congressionally declared
free territory.177 Essentially the Court declared the Missouri Compromise
of 1820—which had been repealed by the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854—
unconstitutional.178 This was the first instance in which the Supreme Court
173. As of 1850, the Court had achieved an extremely high degree of public support. Id. at 63.
174. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1857).
175. The dispute over the LeCompton Constitution in Kansas and the election of Lincoln as
President, pushed the nation closer to Civil War than the Dred Scott decision. DON E. FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 561–67 (1978); EARL
M. MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 154 (2007) (“Modern historians generally
do not view Dred Scott as a major cause of the Civil War . . . .”).
176. Sandford, 60 U.S. at 427.
177. Id. at 450.
178. Although the Missouri Compromise has been repealed by the time of the Dred Scott
decision, it had been the law at the time that Scott had been taken into the Upper Louisiana Territory.
Id. at 519 (addressing Scott’s argument that the Missouri Compromise granted his freedom at the time
he entered free territory).
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evoked the concept of substantive due process, although it did so without
careful analysis. As with subsequent use of substantive due process in the
Lochner era and again with the contemporary right to privacy, the theory as
utilized in Dred Scott would only thinly cover a judicial value judgment.
The majority in Dred Scott decided the case on the broadest and most
politically explosive grounds when there were several less controversial
means for disposing of the case.179 In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney
attempted to dress his obvious political opinion in legalistic analysis;
however, his arguments were highly selective and disingenuous and failed to
persuade the persuadable.180 Apparently, the Court did not realize how
controversial its opinion would be.181 Dred Scott is quite properly
condemned for reaching morally and legally indefensible results on the
issues that the Court addressed.182 Beyond that, the most serious failing of
Dred Scott is that the Court vainly attempted to resolve by judicial decree a
As
political issue that was far beyond judicial resolution.183
Professor McCloskey noted, the Court should “leave alone” questions that
“profoundly engage the emotions of the whole people.”184 In the Court’s
defense, the political branches had invited the Court to resolve the
179. The narrowest resolution would have been that proposed by Justice Nelson recognizing
that Missouri had declared Scott a slave, in litigation in state court, and that decision was controlling as
a matter of law. See LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., DO GREAT CASES MAKE BAD LAW? 88–89 (2014)
(discussing potential alternative grounds for the decision).
180. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 122–23 (1993) (criticizing
both the Taney opinion for the Court and the Curtis dissent as “result-oriented” opinions intended to
foster their authors “social vision”).
181. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 24 (1937);
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 62 (“The tempest of malediction that burst over the judges seems to
have stunned them . . . .”).
182. See HOFFER, supra note 171, at 100 (“Taney’s interpretation of the Constitution was
certainly arguable.”). But see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 28–30 (2006) (arguing Taney’s arguments though morally wrong were legally
plausible).
183. WARREN, supra note 181, at 24 (attempting to settle the controversy over slavery in the
territories by judicial decree “would only serve to enflame rather than to extinguish”). Many of the
critics of the decision at the time made this very argument. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 114.
184. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 60 (“They should have realized that their power was built
on a lively sense of its own limitations . . . .”). Id. at 63 (stating the Court’s greatest mistake was “to
imagine that a flaming political issue could be quenched by calling it a ‘legal’ issue and deciding it
judicially”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 124 (“[T]he Court was stretching judicial power to the
breaking point.”); MALTZ, supra note 175, at 156 (“[T]he story of Dred Scott is a story of judicial
hubris.”); NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 138 (“When the Court decided Dred Scott, it put itself on trial.”);
Maurice Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221, 243 (1925)
(“A question which involved a Civil War can hardly be proper material for the wrangling of lawyers.”).
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troublesome issue of slavery in the territories.185 Perhaps to a large extent,
the Dred Scott Court was a victim of its own prior success. Under Taney, the
Court had achieved great public support, arguably causing both the Justices
and political actors to assume that it could resolve a wrenching and divisive
political issue through constitutional adjudication.186 From a moral and
legal standpoint, the Court threw its weight behind the wrong result both
then and now. The opponents of the decision responded with fury.187 The
defenders of the decision relied on “rule of law” arguments.188 The critics
dismissed the controversial holding, invalidating the Missouri Compromise
as dicta, which it clearly was not.189 The decision became a central issue in
the famous Lincoln Douglas debates the following year.190 Several
northern state legislatures passed resolutions condemning the decision,191
much like the Virginia legislature’s resolution condemning McCulloch.
185. SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 110–11; LUCAS A. POWE, JR. & L.A. SCOT POWE,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 105–06 (2009). Even Lincoln
urged the Court to resolve the issue of slavery in the territories. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 111.
186. SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 106 (“The Dred Scott Court fell victim to its own success as
a governmental institution.”).
187. WARREN, supra note 181, at 24–25 (A “whirlwind of abuse . . . swept upon the
Court . . . .”); see id. at 26–38 (quoting press critiques of the Dred Scott decision); FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 175, at 417 (discussing how the decision was denounced in the press as “atrocious,” “wicked,”
and “abominable”).
188. Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political Speeches and Debates of Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Chicago, Illinois (July 9, 1858) (“[T]he decision of the highest
tribunal known to the Constitution of the country must be final till it has been reversed by an equally
high authority.”); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political Speeches and Debates of Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1858) (“[T]hat decision becomes the
law of the land, binding on you, on me . . . .”).
189. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 114. The dicta argument was based on the assertion that it
was inappropriate for the Court to reach the Missouri Compromise question after having concluded
that Scott was not a citizen and hence there was no jurisdiction under the diversity of citizenship clause.
The problem with this argument is that only three Justices joined the former holding while six joined
that latter. See BLOOM, JR., supra note 179, at 88 (“And yet the latter can hardly be dismissed as dicta
as it often has been, given that it had the support of six [J]ustices while the former position seemed to
have only three.”).
190. See generally Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates in
Ottawa, Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, The Lincoln-Douglas
Debates in Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political
Speeches and Debates of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15,
1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Political Speeches and Debates of Abraham Lincoln
and Stephen A. Douglas in Charleston, Illinois (Sept. 18, 1858); Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A.
Douglas, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates in Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858); HARRY V. JAFFA &
ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE 40 (1959).
191. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 432.
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However, the decision would have been as divisive had the Court reached
the opposite result. The question of the legality of congressional regulation
of slavery in the territories had become so inflammatory that it was well
beyond judicial resolution. Perhaps it was beyond political resolution as
well. Certainly, Congress and the President had been unable to settle it up
to that point. Maybe it could only be resolved through secession and the
violence of the Civil War. In any event, the Court, and much of the political
establishment, that pressed for a judicial solution were deluded. No case
has attested to the limits of judicial power more than Dred Scott. Despite the
controversial nature of the Dred Scott opinion, its critics, unlike the critics of
M’Culloch v. Maryland, did not urge outright defiance but rather reversal
through the legal process, especially through the appointment of Justices
with a different point of view.192
Critics argue the Court’s Scott v. Sanford decision wounded the Court’s
reputation for decades to come.193 However, that probably is not so.194
First, the Civil War diverted attention from the Court for
the first part of the next decade, even though Chief Justice Taney continued
to tussle with President Lincoln.195 Second, Lincoln replaced many of the
Justices who decided the Dred Scott case, molding the Court into a more
nationalistic institution.196 Third, the Court did not behave as if its prestige
192. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 119; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 454 (noting how
Dred Scott did not cause its critics to attempt to constrain the Court’s authority but rather to win the
next election and alter the Court’s membership). That was the position that Lincoln took. POWE, JR.
& POWE, supra note 185, at 105.
193. Edwin S. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision, in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrine, 27 AM.
HIST. REV. 69 (1911) (discussing the “shattered reputation” of the Court after the Dred Scott decision);
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 81, at 63 (recounting how the Court’s near unanimous support was destroyed
by the Dred Scott decision). Charles Warren argued it was biased reporting of the decision in part, as
much as the decision itself that wounded the Court’s reputation. WARREN, supra note 181, at 39.
194. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 175, at 454 (“The extent to which the [Dred Scott] decision
undermined the Court as an institution has in fact been greatly exaggerated.”); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 147, at 137 (“The Supreme Court experienced a remarkable rise in respect and importance during
the generation following the Civil War.”).
195. Sitting as a circuit judge, Taney ordered Lincoln to release John Merryman, who had been
arrested in Maryland for secessionist activities, from custody. The commanding officer on whom
Taney’s order was delivered refused. Taney then issued an opinion criticizing Lincoln’s suspension of
habeas corpus as well as the arrest of Merryman. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861).
Despite Taney’s opinion, Lincoln did not comply. But see Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman:
Myth, History and Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 501–06 (2016) (offering a different interpretation of
the incident, arguing there was no defiance by anyone).
196. Lincoln appointed five Justices to the Court, including Samuel Chase as Chief Justice on
Taney’s death.
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had suffered. Rather, it invalidated more federal laws in the decade and onehalf following Dred Scott than it had in the preceding seventy years.197
Except for the Legal Tender Cases198 in which the Court initially invalidated
paper money as legal tender, and then with the addition of two new Justices
changed its mind, the Court managed to land on its feet following the
debacle of Dred Scott. The initial decision invalidating paper currency as legal
tender indicated that a majority of the Court did not feel at all intimidated
by the negative reaction to the Dred Scott case twelve years earlier. Again,
the Court as an institution was saved by the President and Senate’s ability to
change its composition to some extent because several southern Justices
resigned with the advent of the Civil War. The Dred Scott debacle could have
seriously threatened the Court’s legitimacy as a constitutional interpreter had
it not been for the war.
D. The Rise and Fall of the Lochner Era
For the most part, the Court, with the aid of highly capable Justices,
managed to avoid public controversy for the next two and one-half decades
until 1895, when it decided three cases that once again placed it very much
in the public limelight. Within a short period of time, the Court invalidated
the income tax,199 struck down the government’s attempt to apply the
Sherman Antitrust Act to a massive monopoly in the sugar industry,200 and
sustained an injunction against a labor strike involving the Pullman
company.201 The following year, William Jennings Bryan ran for the
presidency to some extent on an anti-Supreme Court platform but was
defeated by William McKinley.202 With the emergence of the progressive
movement, these decisions cast the Court as the defender of wealth and
197. SCHWARTZ, supra note 180, at 154. Despite Lincoln’s appointments, the Court continued
to battle the radical Republican Congress. Adamany, supra note 72, at 834–35 (discussing the cases that
the Supreme Court decided after Lincoln’s appointment).
198. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 626 (1869), the Court ruled that paper money could
not qualify as legal tender under the Constitution. The following year in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
457, 586 (1870), with the addition of two new Justices to the Court, it reached the opposite result. See
BLOOM, JR., supra, note 179, at 97–113 (discussing these decisions). This may or may not have been
an example of the appointment power being employed to modify the direction of the Court depending
on one’s view of the underlying facts. See id. (discussing these decisions).
199. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co.,157 U.S. 429, 625, 675 (1895); see also BLOOM, JR.,
supra, note 179, at 151–65 (discussing the three cases).
200. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12–13 (1895).
201. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599–600 (1895).
202. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369,
384 (1992).
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power against the emerging reform movement. These cases, though
controversial, did not imperil the Court’s legitimacy. At the same time, the
Court began its four-decade-long venture against economic reform
legislation prompted by the problems triggered by the industrial revolution.
Concerning federal reform legislation, the Court applied the concept of dual
sovereignty to sharply limit the federal government’s power to address
economic issues at the local level.203 At the same time, the Court developed
the economic substantive due process liberty-of-contract doctrine,
characterized by its decision in Lochner v. New York,204 to invalidate much
state-level economic and social welfare legislation as well. The Court’s
employment of constitutional doctrines to flout the will of legislative
majorities in the areas of economic and social legislation continued for the
better part of four decades.
One might have thought that the doctrine of substantive due process,
first articulated by the Court in Dred Scott, had perished with the rejection of
most of that opinion following the Civil War. However, the Court had other
plans. In the case of Munn v. Illinois205 in 1877, the Court acknowledged
that substantive due process liberty of contract was a valid legal theory but
did not yet employ it to invalidate state legislation. Within two decades,
however, the Court began relying on the doctrine to invalidate state
economic regulation. Although the Court employed substantive due
process to invalidate hundreds of state laws for over forty years, the period
has become known as the Lochner era on account of the decision in the 1905
case of Lochner v. New York. In a five-to-four ruling, the Court invalidated a
New York law that limited a baker’s workweek to sixty hours. Lochner
emerged as the case which characterized this era due in part to the Court’s
detailed explication of the doctrine along with the famous dissent by
Justice Holmes. The Court rejected the state’s health justification as
unsupported by evidence and declared that regulating labor relations
exceeded the boundaries of the police power.206 As such, the regulation
infringed a baker’s substantive due process liberty of contract to agree to
work as many hours as the parties desire.
Justice Holmes wrote a short but classic dissent, forever upstaging the
majority opinion. He rejected the liberty-of-contract doctrine, arguing that
203. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12–13 (providing an excellent early example of the dual
federalism approach).
204. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
205. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
206. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
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no particular aspect of liberty is more highly protected than any other.207
He maintained the state had the right to regulate any exercise of liberty if it
had a legitimate police power rationale for doing so and that regulating labor
relations was such a justification. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Holmes dissent was his declaration that the Constitution did not “embody
a particular economic theory.”208 By implication, he alleged that the
majority was reading its favored laissez-faire theory into the Constitution—
that is, substituting its own particular value preferences for constitutional
law. This is the classic critique of substantive due process, whether
employed in Dred Scott, Lochner, or Roe v. Wade. The doctrine allows the
Court to prefer those aspects of liberty, whether slave ownership, freedom
of contract, or the right to obtain an abortion over state regulation to the
contrary. As contemporary commentators have argued, the Lochner Court
may have had more legal support for its liberty-of-contract doctrine than
Holmes assumed.209 Nevertheless, Holmes’s critique rang true. Lochner
became a bad word in constitutional jurisprudence.210 Certainly, after its
rejection, the Lochner era came to represent a Court determined to impose
its own preferred values through its decisions in constitutional cases.
During this period, the Court faced vigorous public and professional
criticism, and pointed internal criticism through the dissents of
Justice Holmes.211 Amidst the Great Depression, matters came to a head
when the Court struck down several measures passed at the behest of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt as part of his New Deal and struck down
the state regulations of economic matters.212 The following year, perhaps
influenced by the President’s court packing threats or public
207. Id. at 75.
208. Id. at 75–76.
209. David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the
Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325, 327 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (“Virtually
no serious scholar of the Lochner era believes any longer that the Lochner Court simply tried to impose
laissez-faire or was influenced much by Social Darwinism.”). The legal principles guiding the Lochner
Court are grounded in a combination of Jacksonian anti-class bias along with the free labor ideology
of the abolitionist movement.
210. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14–15
(1980).
211. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 178 (“In the aftermath of Lochner, prominent lawyers began
to attack not just judicial decisions but the institution of judicial review itself.”).
212. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935) (limiting
the reach of the National Industrial Recovery Act through a narrow construction of the commerce
clause); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (invalidating a state minimum
wage law on the ground that it violated the substantive due process liberty of contract).

2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS?

333

dissatisfaction,213 the Court radically changed directions rejecting dual
federalism at the national level214 and substantive due process at the state
level.215 In rejecting substantive due process methodology, the Court
embraced the critique set forth by Holmes in Lochner v. New York.216 As a
result, the Court changed directions before the President had the
opportunity to alter its composition through the appointment process.217
To a large extent, the Court may have been responding to widespread public
disagreement with the substance of its decisions—that is, with respect to
the results rather than the interpretive methodology.218 Amid the
Depression, the public preferred government intervention in economic
affairs. President Roosevelt, along with other critics of the Court, had
effectively characterized the Court as an obstacle to such policies.219 Times
were hard, the Court was perceived as blocking the way to economic
recovery, and as such, the Court had lost critical public support. Whether
its legal doctrines and reasoning were correct or at least reasonably plausible
was beside the point. The severity of the economic circumstances, the
popular President’s persuasiveness, and the accumulation of decades of
questionable precedent combined to seriously undermine diffuse support
for the Court. Under these circumstances, a majority of the Court selfcorrected before external correction could occur. Nevertheless, the Court’s
withdrawal from the economic sphere was cemented by the eventual
replacement of Justices who had stood as an obstacle to economic reform
213. See generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT (2010) (remaining disputed as to the extent to which the Justices may have been aware of the
yet publicly announced court packing proposal).
214. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (expanding Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause by upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935).
215. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (rejecting substantive due process
liberty of contract analysis and upholding state minimum wage legislation).
216. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that
the word ‘liberty’ in the 14th Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law. It does not need research to show that no such sweeping
condemnation can be passed upon the statute before us.”).
217. See SHESOL, supra note 213, at 2–3 (detailing the account of the battle between
President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court).
218. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 4 (“In effect, a tacit deal was reached: the American
people would grant the [J]ustices their power, so long as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution did not stray too far from what a majority of the people believed it should be.”).
219. SHESOL, supra note 213, at 148–50.
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legislation. The judicial revolution of 1937 is yet a further example of an
overreaching Court eventually succumbing to a combination of public
pressure and appointment power.
E. The Warren Court—Many Bridges Too Far
For the next two decades, the Court largely avoided public controversy
by slowly shifting its focus from constitutional challenges of economic
regulation to questions involving civil rights and liberties.220 Under the
Warren Court, the public perceptions of the Court changed significantly.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Court engaged in aggressive constitutional
decision-making by challenging racial segregation in public schools, ordering
reapportionment of state legislatures based on population equality, banning
prayer in public schools, making it more difficult for states to provide
financial aid to religious schools, protecting the rights of criminal
defendants, and recognizing a constitutionally based right to privacy.221 In
achieving these substantive results, the Court often played fast and loose
with existing judicial precedent. The public accepted many of these
decisions in their own right. However, the aggregation of these decisions
gave rise to the perception that a group of unelected Justices of the Supreme
Court had embarked on an undemocratic attempt to alter the very basis of
American society. Brown v. Board of Education222 is the cornerstone of
Warren Court jurisprudence. Arguably, it the most significant decision in
Supreme Court history. Brown was pending before the Court when Earl
Warren was nominated as Chief Justice.223 Brown’s legal correctness is now
beyond dispute. And yet, that has not always been the case. Respected
members of the Brown Court, most particularly, Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson, worried that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs was legally
insupportable, and most of the two-year process of reaching a decision was
necessary to convince them otherwise.224 Moreover, Professor Wechsler,
220. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting the shift in
emphasis that was telegraphed shortly after the judicial revolution of 1937 in the now famous footnote
4 of Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court).
221. See Baum & Devins, supra note 37, at 1565 (explaining the Warren Court may have
perceived support and encouragement from left-leaning academics and the media elite).
222. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
223. Warren joined the Court with a recess appointment. The Senate would not confirm
Warren until he had begun writing the opinion in Brown.
224. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (detailing the history and
decision in Brown v. Board of Education); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD

2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS?

335

perhaps the most prominent law professor of his era, delivered an address
at Harvard Law School in 1959, arguing Brown failed the test of justification
by neutral and general principles.225 Despite these criticisms, Brown was
clearly defensible. The defendants in Brown argued that a decision in favor
of desegregation was inconsistent with the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson.226
However, the Court was able to honestly deflect each argument. First, based
on the uncited memoranda of Justice Frankfurter’s law clerk, Alexander
Bickel,227 the Court held that the original understanding was
inconclusive.228 Furthermore, based on precedent, the Court demonstrated
that Plessy had in fact been undermined by the series of graduate school cases
decided by the Court in the interim.229
Thus, neither the original understanding nor precedent provided an
insurmountable obstacle to a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs needed a legal rationale to decide in their favor, and
Chief Justice Warren clearly had one. The problem, however, was that he
could not explicitly rely on it. At the first conference over which
Chief Justice Warren presided, following the second round of arguments in
Brown, Justice Warren began by declaring that racial segregation in schools
was based on the constitutionally illegitimate purpose of racism.230 As
such, segregation was constitutionally invalid. The problem was that
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1956–1961 (1994) (“The way the [J]ustices responded to each
case the NAACP presented affected what Marshall and his colleagues could do in the next case.”).
225. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32
(1959) (“The problem inheres strictly in the reasoning of the opinion, an opinion which is often read
with less fidelity by those who praise it than by those by whom it is condemned.”).
226. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (holding separate but equal racial
segregation on a train was constitutional, essentially endorsing Jim Crowe segregation laws throughout
the South), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
227. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 64–65 (1955) (expressing the essence of Alexander Bickel’s memo when he was a law clerk for
Justice Frankfurter).
228. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (“[T]he inconclusive nature of the
Amendment’s history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that
time.”).
229. See id. at 491–92 (1954) (“In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality
was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the
same educational qualifications.”).
230. See Brown v. Board of Education & Bolling v. Sharpe, in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE
(1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
654–55 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (“At present, my instincts and tentative feelings would lead me to say
that in these cases we should abolish, in a tolerant way, the practice of segregation in public schools.”).
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Warren acknowledged that he could not use that as the rationale for his
opinion because he wanted to avoid blaming and, hence, provoking the
segregated South, given he understood that its cooperation was essential to
the effective implementation of the decision.231 Justice Warren was forced
to rely on a more problematic explanation of the decision based on the
stigmatic impact of segregation.232 As a result, Brown was a great decision
that was quite clearly legally justified but not necessarily by the Court’s own
explanation.
Nevertheless, Brown contributed to the present troubles of the Court.
First, opponents of originalism have often attempted to use Brown as a
means of discrediting originalism as a valid interpretive methodology.
Opponents argue Brown is inconsistent with the original understanding, and
Brown is a great decision; thus, originalism must be wrong.233 As noted
above, the argument that Brown is inconsistent with the original
understanding is a gross overstatement often made disingenuously.234
However, to the extent that people believe Brown was legally insupportable
but correctly decided can lead to the belief that it is generally appropriate
for courts to reach a morally just decision regardless of whether it is legally
supported or not. This is clearly an incorrect understanding of Brown. Still,
some believe that Brown established the dawn of the “living Constitution
era” and from 1954 on anything goes.
Even assuming merely for the sake of argument that Brown was legally
insupportable, the fact that the decision was correctly decided should not be
taken to mean that traditional methods of constitutional analysis have been
or should be rejected in all contexts. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment
was concerned with the prohibition of racial discrimination, at least in
certain contexts. It was not as if the Brown Court attempted to address an
issue of no constitutional concern whatsoever. There was at least some
textual, originalist grounding for the decision. Second, even if accepted legal
methods did not lead to the decision in Brown, the moral evil of racial

231. See KLUGER, supra note 224, at 696 (stating Warren circulated his draft opinion in Brown
with a cover memo indicating that the opinion needed to be “short, readable by the lay public, nonrhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory”).
232. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”).
233. See STRAUSS, supra note 129, at 12, 78, 85.
234. See BORK, supra note 83, at 82 (siding with the argument Brown was consistent with the
original understanding).
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segregation was such that it demanded judicial action. As such, Brown was
legitimately a one-off type decision. It was correct whether or not easily
justified, but that in itself should not throw the door open to unjustifiable
decisions in other areas as well. Hence, even if Brown was legally
insupportable, which it was not, it should not be viewed as creating a
battering ram to justify other insupportable decisions.
There is another way in which Brown may have created the perception that
the Court should be aggressive in the pursuit of justice and fairness,
regardless of the law. One valid criticism of Brown is that for a lengthy period
of time, ten to fifteen years, the Court failed to provide support and
guidance to lower court judges struggling with the difficult task of molding
desegregation decrees in the midst of massive, often violent, resistance.
Many lower court judges performed heroically under very challenging
circumstances.235 These judges are worthy of the praise they have received.
However, an unfortunate byproduct of these efforts was to create, at least
for some, a mythology of the judge as a hero. From this perspective, the
federal district judge was perceived as a knight in armor authorized to do
battle with corruption, unfairness, and injustice whenever identified in
litigation. This is an improper conception of the role of the federal judge;
however, it would seem to be the self-perception that at least some federal
district judges have taken from the attempt of many courageous district
judges struggling to apply Brown’s mandate in very difficult circumstances.
A related problem raised by the enforcement issues created by Brown was
the growth of institutional reform litigation and structural injunction as an
enforcement tool.236 In fashioning desegregation orders, district judges
turned to the continuing injunction by which a school district was placed
under judicial control until it satisfied the district judge that it had fully
complied with the desegregation decree.237 The continuing injunction was
not created in the context of school desegregation. Rather, it was borrowed
from the antitrust field.238 However, in law, arguments made by analogy
235. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 14 (1981) (“None acted with greater impact—
on the region and ultimately on the nation—than the heroic band of [lower court] judges . . . .”).
236. See generally Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 51 (1982) (“[A]s in the school cases, the precise level of remedial action and the components
of a remedial prescription will reflect a range of factors—including, I believe, availability of resources—
that are unrelated to liability.”).
237. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“During this period of transition, the
courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.”).
238. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 137 (1948) (affirming the
district court ruling of an injunction against Paramount Pictures).
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often prevail, that is, one thing frequently leads to another. Accordingly, the
continuing injunction came from litigation for institutional reform but
placed in the context of desegregation. If federal district courts could
employ the continuing injunction as a means of desegregating the schools,
why not also employ it to right constitutional wrongs in prisons,239 and
state hospitals240 and other state-run institutions? Granted, federal judges
generally did not embark on these crusades uninvited. Rather, they were
urged to employ the tools developed in the desegregation area to other state
institutions by civil rights attorneys. The judges often complied. Over time,
several district judges became deeply involved in the judicial reform of
various state institutions generally based on the predicate of unremedied
constitutional violations. The growth of institutional reform litigation also
supported the assumption that it was the job of federal judges to right legal
and constitutional wrongs wherever they appeared, even if that led to
judicial control over an entire state institution and bureaucracy.
Brown v. Board of Education was one of the Supreme Court’s greatest
decisions. The case needed to be decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, it did produce some unhealthy consequences for the judicial
system, some of which could have been avoided and others which probably
could not.
In the wake of Brown, in 1957, the Court decided several cases making it
difficult, if not impossible, to successfully prosecute leaders of the
American Communist Party or to investigate membership in the party. The
simultaneous release of four of these decisions was characterized as “Red
Monday.”241 Six years earlier, the Court upheld the convictions of the
leaders of the American Communist Party under the Smith Act in Dennis v.

239. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980) aff'd in part and vacated in part,
679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982) (asserting judicial control over the Texas
prison system).
240. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding structural injunction
against state institution for civilly committed sexually violent predators); see also Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding structural injunction against a state school designed to
help the civilly committed mentally handicapped).
241. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957) (“It is only those investigations that
are conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of individuals
against illegal encroachment.”); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266–67 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (concluding the decision was based on “the right to political privacy, as
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection”); see also Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (using
the First Amendment to provide constitutional protection to the members of the Party).
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United States.242 The abrupt change of direction with respect to the
investigation and prosecution of members of the American
Communist Party led to a vigorous political reaction against the Court in
Congress, the Bar, and the Academy.243 In view of this reaction, the Court
backed off in subsequent cases.244
Perhaps the most visible and criticized line of decisions from the Warren
Court were the cases in which the Court attempted to reform the criminal
process during the 1960s. This was a major project of the Warren Court
and, with modifications by subsequent courts, was largely successful. The
decisions are too numerous to consider individually. However, the
highlights include Gideon v. Wainwright,245 which extended appointed
counsel to all indigent felony defendants, Mapp v. Ohio,246 which required
that illegally seized evidence be excluded in state criminal trials, Miranda v.
Arizona,247 which established that the police officers must administer the
infamous Miranda warnings before obtaining a confession that could be
admissible in evidence, and United States v. Wade,248 which required the
presence of an attorney for the accused must be present before the police
could place the suspect in a lineup.
These cases were controversial, especially Mapp and Miranda, which were
portrayed as leading to the release of dangerous criminals, including
murderers and rapists. The public became familiar with these decisions
through movies and television shows, where these cases were frequently
portrayed in a bad light.249 Reporter Fred Graham wrote a book on the
242. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (convicting members of the
American Communist Party under the Smith Act to assist in stopping the spread of communism in the
U.S.).
243. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 253–58.
244. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 274 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When belief
in an idea is punished as it is today, we sacrifice those ideals and substitute an alien, totalitarian
philosophy in their stead.”); see also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
169 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I would reverse this case and leave the Communists free to advocate
their beliefs in proletarian dictatorship publicly . . . .”).
245. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). Gideon was better received in part because
of Henry Fonda’s sympathetic portrayal of Gideon in a made-for-TV movie, almost twenty years later
and partially due to the fact that Florida, the state defendant in the case, was a rather extreme outlier,
given that most states already provided indigent defendants with counsel in felony cases. GIDEON’S
TRUMPET (Hallmark Hall of Fame 1980).
246. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
247. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
248. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
249. See, e.g., DIRTY HARRY (The Malpaso Company 1971) (providing a prominent example of
negative results occurring from Supreme Court rulings).
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political impact of the Court’s criminal procedure cases, appropriately titled
“The Self-Inflicted Wound.”250 President Nixon based his successful 1968
campaign on a law-and-order theme at least partially aimed at the Court’s
criminal procedure decisions. Despite the fact that this series of cases was
publicly visible and politically controversial at the time, they are not
responsible for the perception that the Court had abandoned its role of
applying the law to decide cases based on traditionally accepted methods of
interpretation and analysis.
First, every criminal procedure case started out with explicit textual
provisions such as the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel.
Interpreting these textually based rights is what the Court is expected to do.
In that sense, the Court hardly wandered outside of its legitimate domain in
adjudicating these cases. Even so, the Court can readily start out with an
explicit provision of constitutional text and then reason its way to an
incorrect decision, as the Court arguably did in Miranda. This is
troublesome, but should not raise significant doubts as to the legitimacy of
the Court as an institution as long as it is able to make plausible legal
arguments in support of its decision. It is understood that the type of
cutting-edge cases that the Supreme Court tends to decide are capable of
producing plausible opposing arguments, each based on accepted
interpretive methodology. That occurred in the Court’s significant
constitutional criminal procedure cases during the 1960s. The fact that the
Court may have been agenda driven and that it may have misinterpreted the
constitutional provisions in issue should not raise questions as to its
legitimacy especially since these decisions, at least as qualified by subsequent
precedent, have become embedded in the law and have been largely
accepted by the public.
The Warren Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, especially its
school prayer cases,251 also led to significant backlash against the Court.
Apparently, the extent and vigor of the public reaction against these

250. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970) (noting changes in
criminal procedure that the Supreme Court was directly responsible for).
251. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (asserting the use of a daily morning prayer as
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 205 (1963) (examining state action requiring the reading of Bible verses in school as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and Establishment Clause).
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decisions surprised the Court.252 These cases are frequently considered the
most publicly defied decisions of the recent Court, especially in certain areas
of the nation.253 Because the Court ignored and disregarded lengthy public
traditions, many viewed these decisions as illegitimate because they were
aggressively hostile to fundamental public values. As with the criminal
procedure cases, the Establishment Clause cases were at least defensible as
plausible interpretations of text based on standard interpretive technique.
Perhaps the reason why these decisions are not as harmful to the Court’s
credibility on a long-term basis as they once appeared, is that overtime, the
Court recognized it had pushed its secular vision too far and has since
moderated its former approach in the Establishment Clause context.254
The Establishment Clause cases may be evidence of the realistic political
check that constrains the Court. When the Court renders unpopular and
arguably legally incorrect decisions, over time the Court is subject to
correction through narrowing, if not outright rejection, pursuant to the
judicial appointment process and the emergence of subsequent cases testing
previous assumptions.
Some would trace the decline of the Court’s standing with at least a
segment of the voting public to the decision of Roe v. Wade 255 in 1973 or
perhaps its progenitor, Griswold v. Connecticut 256 in 1965. Roe is certainly the
flash point because of the nature of the issue itself, due in large part to the
emotional passions evoked on both sides of the abortion debate. However,
the pattern of decision-making leading to Roe is best traced to a pair of earlier

252. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 265.
253. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 92
(1970) (“There has been very little in the way of general assent to . . . [the school prayer] decisions, not
only in a single recalcitrant region, but throughout the country . . . .”).
254. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983) (upholding state tax credit for educational
expenses including expenses at a religious school); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09
(1997) (validating a program sending public school teachers into parochial schools to teach remedial
subjects and overruling a prior decision in the same case invalidating the program); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (justifying a program of lending media supplies to private schools, including
religious schools); Zelmon v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (approving a school
voucher program although an overwhelming percentage of the vouchers were used at religious
schools).
255. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (1973) (holding
abortion was within the scope of the liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause).
256. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding marriage and
the right to use contraceptives lie “within the zones of privacy created . . . by constitutional
guarantees”).
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decisions, Baker v. Carr 257 and Reynolds v. Sims,258 involving the issue of the
judicial role in curing gross malapportionment in state legislative bodies.259
The decision in Baker v. Carr, endorsing a judicial role in curing political
reapportionment, and the subsequent adoption of the one-person one-vote
solution to the issue two years later in Reynolds v. Sims were popular decisions
with the public to the extent the public was aware of them.260 These
opinions were much less popular with the political elites who believed that
the Court had improperly intruded into their own domain.261 Still, the cases
are considered foundational pillars of democracy and constitutional law
despite the fact the decisions, especially Reynolds v. Sims, flew in the face of
text, original understanding, precedent, and constitutional structure. As the
critics, including Justice Harlan dissenting in Reynolds v. Sims, recognized at
the time, the methodology and potential consequences of the decisions were
deeply flawed and had the potential of leading to more problems in the
future.262
257. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (concluding apportionment cases pose
“a justiciable constitutional cause of action” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
258. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (affirming the holding in Baker
that apportionment cases pose a justiciable constitutional cause of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
259. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 187–88 (noting that this cause of action originated from deprivation
of voting rights by citizens in Tennessee); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 536–37 (indicating the case arose
from the act of the Alabama Legislature in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
260. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 133
(1980) (citing a poll finding 60% public approval). Id. at 151 (indicating only three percent of the
population knew of the decisions); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 255 (2002) (noting an absence of public awareness of the decisions); Murphy & Tanenhaus,
supra note 15, at 996 (“[T]he issue of reapportionment was almost invisible to the national public in
1964 and 1966 . . . .”).
261. See generally POWE, JR., supra note 260, at 253–553 (discussing the passage of a bill by the
United States House of Representatives stripping federal courts of the jurisdiction for reapportionment
cases); see also COX, supra note 147, at 301 (highlighting thirty-two states called for a constitutional
convention to reverse Reynolds, and the call fell two states short of the necessary supermajority).
262. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 598 (Harlan., J., dissenting) (discussing repercussions of the
Court’s decision in the case); COX, supra note 147, at 303 (discussing Solicitor General Archibald Cox,
who argued the cases as an amicus on behalf of the United States, later admitted that “[t]he Court went
extraordinarily far in breaking away from established practices, with little apparent support in
conventional sources of law” but concluded the Court “was justified by identifying deeper shared
values.”); see also RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 236 (1970) (discussing the
recognition that Reynolds “was the farthest-reaching . . . [exercise of judicial review] ‘since Marbury v.
Madison’ . . . .”); see also BICKEL, supra note 253, at 172–77 (sharing Bickel’s—one of the leading
constitutional law scholars of his time—criticism the Reynolds decision); see also MORTON J. HOROWITZ,
THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 85 (1998) (discussing the opinion of the author,
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On several occasions, Chief Justice Warren declared that these were the
most significant decisions of his tenure263—with the exception of Brown v.
Board of Education. The reapportionment decisions are deeply embedded in
constitutional jurisprudence. Contrary to predictions by leading and
respected scholars,264 the decisions were implemented without difficulty.
The democratic majoritarian principles animating the decisions have
become foundational constitutional concepts. The Court’s one-person,
one-vote principle strikes most of the public as eminently fair. Indeed, the
reapportionment decisions are characterized as the success story of the
Warren Court.265
In view of all of this, how could such well received decisions possibly
have led to questions as to the Court’s legitimacy?
Don’t the
reapportionment decisions represent the Court at its finest? The answer is
not because of the results of these decisions, which have largely stood the
test of time and are deeply embedded in our constitutional system. Rather,
the answer is the decision-making process that delivered the results. In first
deciding to resolve the issue at all and then selecting a particular metric, the
Court proceeded in a defiantly non-judicial manner. The reapportionment
cases are among the most blatant examples of “the ends justify the means”
methodology in the annals of the United States Reports.
Baker v. Carr was a great case.266 Like many great cases, Baker was argued
to the Court twice. The question was whether a challenge to the
malapportionment of Tennessee legislative districts could be heard by a
federal court or whether it should be dismissed as a non-justiciable political
question. Fifteen years earlier in Colegrove v. Green,267 the Court dismissed a
Professor Martin Horowitz, who enthusiastically approves of the decision, conceded that it could only
be justified on “a living Constitution” theory).
263. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 184 (1983)
(discussing declarations made by former Chief Justice Warren regarding the importance of the
reapportionment decisions during an interview on June 25, 1969); see also EARL WARREN, THE
MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 306 (1977) (“It seemed to me that accolade . . . [of] the
most important case of my tenure on the Court . . . should go to the case of Baker v. Carr . . . .”).
264. See BICKEL, supra note 253, at 173 (predicting that the reapportionment decisions were
“head[ed] toward obsolescence, and . . . abandonment.”); HERBERT WECHSLER, THE
NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 25 (1968).
265. See ROBERT B. MCKAY, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV.
223, 229 (1968) (opining the success story of the Court’s reapportionment decisions was due to lack
of opposition from the public).
266. See generally BLOOM, JR., supra note 179, at 235–52 (2014) (noting the weight
Chief Justice Warren gave to Baker v. Carr in contrast to Brown v. Board of Education).
267. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), abrogated by Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120
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constitutional challenge to the Illinois Legislature based on the Guarantee
Clause of Article IV.268 There was no majority opinion in Colegrove,
however, the dominant plurality opinion written by Justice Frankfurter
argued for dismissal under the political question doctrine due to lack of
judicially manageable standards.269 Justice Frankfurter famously warned
that the Court should not enter the “political thicket.”270
In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan rejected the political question argument
(the central issue in the case) acknowledging that there were no judicially
manageable standards under the Guarantee Clause, the basis of the Colegrove
challenge.
However there were such standards under the
Equal Protection Clause, the basis of the claim in Baker.271
Justice Frankfurter wrote a lengthy, impassioned dissent arguing that
reapportionment challenges should be dismissed under the political
question doctrine, not due to the particular legal theory raised but rather due
to the nature of the underlying issue.272 He asserted that this “destructively
novel judicial power . . . may well impair the Court’s position as the ultimate
organ of the ‘[S]upreme Law of the Land’ . . . .”273 Justice Frankfurter
argued that the Constitution simply did not endorse a particular theory of
representation and hence apportionment, and consequently the Court,
would need to adopt its own theory independent of anything in the
Constitution in order to decide the case.274 Justice Frankfurter argued that
(2016).
268. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), abrogated by Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S.
Ct. 1120 (2016) (holding a violation of the Guarantee Clause falls outside of the scope of judicial action
and therefore cannot be handled by a court).
269. See generally id. at 552–55 (highlighting the danger of the judiciary being involved in the
political aspects of the government).
270. See id. at 556 (warning of the dangers of the judiciary entering into politics and “cutting”
into legislative territory).
271. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226–27 (1962) (noting the principal question is not one
that is relegated to a political branch and recognizing the Court’s competency to handle questions
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
272. See id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is the nature of the controversies arising under
it, nothing else, which has made it judicially unenforceable . . . . [W]here judicial competence is
wanting, it cannot be created by invoking one clause of the Constitution rather than another.”).
273. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
274. See id. at 300 (“What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among
competing bases of representation . . . among competing theories of political philosophy—in order to
establish an appropriate frame of government . . . .”). See generally id. at 302–23 (detailing that
reapportionment based on population equality was not the accepted basis of legislative apportionment
in England, the colonies, the early republic, the states as of the time of ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in contemporary America).
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judicial intervention in legislative apportionment would threaten public
confidence in the Court’s “moral sanction” on which its legitimacy
depended.275 Justice Harlan’s dissent reached the same result by a
somewhat different route, arguing that given that the Constitution did not
endorse any particular theory of legislative representation, no right of the
plaintiffs had been violated and thus the case should have been dismissed
for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.276
Justice Harlan closed his opinion by noting that the decision would please
those who see the Court “primarily as the last refuge for the correction of
all inequality or injustice, no matter what its nature or source . . . .”277
Justice Brennan for the majority and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
dissenting wrote lengthy and scholarly opinions defending their positions.
None of the three appeared to operate outside of the accepted legal
analytical framework. Yet, Baker v. Carr arguably represented one of the
great turning points in constitutional analysis. Justice Frankfurter, in his last
opinion prior to retiring due to a stroke, well understood that by agreeing
that reapportionment challenges were justiciable, the Court was necessarily
engaging in an unwarranted judicial restructuring of the American political
process.
As Justice Frankfurter feared, the Court would need to select a
benchmark among many alternatives and declare that benchmark the
constitutionally requisite standard. The Court did just that in Reynolds v. Sims,
adopting “one person one vote” as the standard with which both houses of
bicameral legislative bodies must forthwith comply. Chief Justice Warren
attempted to dress the opinion in equal protection garb but failed to
persuade. The crucial question as a matter of equal protection analysis is
whether similarly situated persons are being treated differently. If so, there
will be a presumptive equal protection violation. However, the decisive
issue in any equal protection case will be whether persons on each side of
the legislative classification in issue are similarly situated. All persons are

275. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial
Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI. KENT L. REV. 505, 522 (2018) (arguing that Frankfurter was wrong as to
the impact of the reapportionment decisions on public perceptions of the Court and hence its
legitimacy, despite the fact that his constitutional arguments were more solidly grounded than those of
the majority).
276. See id. at 331, 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing the case should have dismissed for failure
to state a claim as the Court no longer “us[ed] the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws
[simply] because they may be unwise . . . .”).
277. Id. at 339.
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similarly situated to other persons in some respects and yet differently
situated in others. From an equal protection standpoint, the question in a
reapportionment case is whether geography matters. Are voters in different
geographic regions of the state differently situated—in which case, the state
may accord greater political power to voters in more thinly populated
regions? Or are they similarly situated—in which case, according more
political power to voters in thinly populated areas would violate equal
protection? Chief Justice Warren opted for the latter, pronouncing that “all
voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where
they live.”278 This was the very crux of the case, and to use the language of
logic, Warren simply assumed his conclusion. The crucial question raised
by Reynolds was how the Court knew the Constitution requires voters in
different geographic areas of the state be similarly situated. Warren had no
answer to this question and did not even seem to realize that it was in fact
the central issue in the case. Warren’s former law clerk and sympathetic
biographer, G. Edward White, declared that in Reynolds, “[Warren] had
substituted homilies . . . for doctrinal analysis.”279
Justice Harlan wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that the Court’s selection
of one-person one-vote was clearly inconsistent with the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment (leaving control of the state electoral process to the
states), constitutional history and tradition, as well as precedent.280 Like
Justice Frankfurter in Baker, Justice Harlan argued that the majority was
simply choosing one of many alternative approaches to representative
apportionment and then embedding it in the Constitution as if it was actually
there. Justice Harlan concluded his opinion with the following diagnosis:
[T]hese decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution
and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that
every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional
‘principle,’ and that this Court should ‘take the lead’ in promoting reform
when other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is not a
panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court,
ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform
movements . . . . [The] Court, limited in function . . . does not serve its high
purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with
278. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
279. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 239 (1982).
280. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589–614 (Harlan J., dissenting) (arguing the majority
opinion’s use of one-person one-vote is wholly inconsistent with history, tradition, and precedent).
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the slow workings of the political process. For when, in the name of
constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution
that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view
of what should be so for the amending process.281

“In a nutshell”—as Justice Harlan would say—he captured what was so
fundamentally wrong with Reynolds v. Sims and the jurisprudence it
encouraged. Indeed, Solicitor General Cox as amicus arguing for the
challengers to malapportionment refused to argue that one-person one-vote
was the standard embodied in the Constitution, instead argued that the gross
malapportionment presented by the cases was unreasonable and
arbitrary.282
Why beat up on Reynolds over fifty years after it was decided? After all, as
noted above, it has incontrovertibly carried the day, at least in terms of its
result. To a large extent because of Reynolds, majoritarian democracy as
expressed through one-person one-vote has become a fundamental
constitutional principle, though that was hardly the case either at the time
of the founding, during the reconstruction era, or immediately prior to the
decision in Reynolds. The real problem with Reynolds, as Justice Harlan
recognized, was that it was a major step toward giving rise to an erroneous
and dangerous conception of the Court’s appropriate role in the
constitutional system. It was especially dangerous because the Court
succeeded in transforming the American political system down to its roots
with very little resistance. The ease with which the Court was able to effect
such a major change in the teeth of so much law to the contrary must have
emboldened the Court to push even further. It also must have convinced a
segment of the public that it was completely appropriate for the Court to
use “constitutional interpretation” to address and hopefully resolve all sorts
of troubling political issues.
The reapportionment decisions were especially damaging because they
created the mindset in many Justices, often a majority, that the appropriate
role of the Court was to resolve troubling and controversial political issues.
All this to ensure fairness and justice when there was little if any supporting
law or even when the existing law was very much to the contrary. In other
words, the reapportionment cases taught at least some of the Justices that it
281. Id. at 624–25 (emphasis added).
282. See COX, supra note 147, at 298 (describing the contents of the amicus curiae as focusing
on an arbitrary and unreasonable departure in violation of the Equal Protection Act as opposed to
support for one-person one-vote).
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was their job to simply “do the right thing” as long as they could get away
with it, and they seemed to be able to get away with a lot.283 These decisions
were equally damaging because they convinced a significant segment of the
public, especially through those including law professors and media
commentators whom the public relied on to explain the decisions, to assume
it is the proper role of the Court to resolve controversial political issues in a
manner that promoted justice and fairness regardless of the presence or
absence of legal support.284 As Earl Maltz noted, “[t]he experience of the
Warren Court . . . conditioned the public to view the Court as a kind of
ultimate substantive authority on substantive moral questions.”285 As such,
the judicial and public mind set created by the reapportionment decisions
created the legal environment that made Roe v. Wade possible.
Only a year after Reynolds, the Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut 286
beginning the inevitable march to Roe v. Wade.287 In Griswold, the Court
invalidated what Justice Stewart’s dissent characterized as “an uncommonly
silly law”288 of Connecticut which made it a crime for married people to
use contraceptives. The specific result of the case was not jarring. However,
the rationale was quite troublesome. As discussed above, during the first
third of the twentieth century, the Court had invalidated much state
economic and social welfare legislation under the rubric of a substantive due
process liberty right to contract. The theory was totally discredited and
rejected by the Court in the mid-1930s. There was every reason to believe
that substantive due process, under which the Court seemed to treat certain
aspects of liberty as far more important than others, had been altogether
discarded as a legitimate constitutional doctrine. Justice Douglas, who
wrote the majority opinion in Griswold, went out of his way to avoid any
reliance on substantive due process, which he had long opposed, by basing
283. BORK, supra note 83, at 77 (“The Court can do what it wishes, and there is almost no way
to stop it, provided its result has a significant political constituency.”).
284. See generally HOROWITZ, supra note 262 (noting the Court’s decisions are justifiable as long
as they further democracy); ELY, supra note 210, at 12–15 (discussing that the Court’s decisions are
justifiable as long as they further democracy); STRAUSS, supra note 129, at 1–2 (discussing the
importance of Justices and judicial rulings in adapting the Constitution to create the common law, “the
living Constitution”).
285. Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 25 (1992).
286. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that marriage and the
right to use contraceptives lie within the zones of privacy created by constitutional guarantees).
287. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding abortion was within the scope of
the liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause).
288. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the opinion on a right to privacy derived from the penumbras and
emanations of various explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights.289
Justice Douglas’s sleight of hand did not fool Justice Black, and in his
dissenting opinion, he charged that the opinion indeed represented a return
to the discredited Lochner era of substantive due process.290
Unfortunately, less than a year after decrying the emerging use of
constitutional interpretation to advance a political agenda in his Reynolds
dissent, Justice Harlan readopted his prior support for a substantive due
process liberty-based approach.291 Justice Harlan erroneously believed that
the due process theory could be adequately constrained by careful
consideration of the teachings of tradition and history.292 Griswold is
stunning proof that a potentially dangerous legal theory cannot be limited
by assurances of counsel or by explicit limitations adopted by the Court in
its opinion. During oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff assured the
Court that a decision in their favor would have no application to laws
prohibiting abortion.293 Almost every Justice who wrote either a majority
or concurring opinion in the case limited its scope to laws affecting married
couples.294 Most of the Justices declared it would have no impact on laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct.295 In subsequent cases, all of these
limitations were discarded.
289. See id. at 481–86 (analyzing many of the amendments of the Bill of Rights to determine the
penumbras emanating from those rights).
290. See id. at 514–15 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that other Justices did not blame Lochner,
despite the reasoning in the case being similar).
291. In the previous case of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), in which the Court dismissed a
challenge to the very same Connecticut statute invalidated in Griswold, Justice Harlan had written a
dissent arguing that the statute should be invalidated under substantive due process liberty. Rather
than restate his prior arguments in Griswold, Justice Harlan simply incorporated by reference his Poe
dissent into his Griswold concurrence. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For
reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman . . . I believe that it does.”).
292. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
293. Oral Argument at 1:04:11, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1964/496 [https://perma.cc/K876-V8KK] (Justice Black: “Would your
argument concerning these things you’ve been talking about relating to privacy, invalidate all laws that
punish people for bringing about abortions?” Thomas Emerson: “No, I think it would not cover thee
abortion laws or the sterilization laws, Your Honor.”).
294. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (“[T]his law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife[.]”). Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he right of privacy in the marital
relation is fundamental and basic[.]”). Id. at 502–03 (White, J., concurring) (“Surely the right invoked
in this case is the right to be free of regulation of the intimacies of marriage relationship[.]”).
295. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (suggesting “[a]dultery, homosexuality and the like are
sexual intimacies which the state forbids” and as such are not implicated by the right to privacy)
(quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The specific result in Griswold was hardly controversial since the Court
invalidated a law that had never been enforced against married couples and
was clearly far out of step with contemporary mores. The harm was serious,
however, in that the Court had unleashed a doctrine that most considered
long dead and buried, which would allow the Court under the rubric of
privacy to invalidate laws that it disapproved of regardless of how long they
had existed or how widely they were supported. The rediscovery of
substantive due process leads directly to Roe v. Wade and later to the Obergefell
v. Hodges 296 decision.
The cumulative impact of the Warren Court precedents in a wide variety
of areas. Especially, school prayer and the rights of criminal defendants
created a widespread degree of public discontent with the Court. Richard
Nixon capitalized on public hostility to the Warren Court by making the
Court an issue in the 1968 presidential campaign.297 The crime rate in the
sixties increased, probably due to demographical reasons unconnected to
the Court’s criminal procedure decisions. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with
the Court resonated with a sufficient number of voters that Nixon
targeted.298 Public backlash against the Warren Court was one of many
issues that led to Nixon’s election.299 Having campaigned against the
Court, Nixon had the unusual political fortune of four Supreme Court
vacancies to be filled during his first presidential term, including the
Chief Justice position following the retirement of Earl Warren.300 With
296. Obergefell v. Hodges, 574 U.S. 1118 (2015).
297. See Chris Hickman, Courting the Right: Richard Nixon’s 1968 Campaign Against the Warren Court,
36 J. SUPREME COURT HISTORY 287, 291 (2012) (describing the evolution of candidate Nixon’s attack
on the Warren Court during the 1968 campaign and the encouragement of that strategy by Judge, later
Chief Justice, Warren Burger); LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME LAW AND POLITICS 211 (1983); see also
Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 385–86 (evidencing Barry Goldwater had run against the Court in the
1964 presidential election but lost decisively to Lyndon Johnson).
298. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the
Supreme Court, 80 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1209, 1216–17, 1223 (1986) (noting an increase in
media coverage of crime tends to lead to a decline in support for the Court and concluding that an
increase in the public perception of judicial activism also resulted in a decline in public support for the
Court).
299. See BICKEL, supra note 253, at 93 (“[T]he election of 1968 may have been something of a
vote of repudiation of the criminal decisions[.]”).
300. Warren had announced his resignation prior to the 1968 election, but due to political
difficulties, the vacancy had not been filled when President Nixon was inaugurated in January 1969.
Justice Fortas had also resigned prior to the Nixon inauguration but once again, political problems
prevented the nomination and confirmation of a replacement by the lame duck President Johnson.
Following the end of the 1971 Supreme Court term, Justices Black and Harlan both retired for health
reasons. That gave President Nixon two further vacancies on the Court to fill during his first term.
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four appointments to the Court, Nixon effectively turned the Court away
from the direction it had taken under Chief Justice Warren. Nixon’s four
appointments to the Court during his first term was yet another example of
how the constitutionally based appointment power can respond to public
dissatisfaction with the Court. Especially in the contentious area of rights
of the accused, an issue that Nixon had campaigned on, the Burger Court
placed constraints on many of the more expansive Warren Court
precedents.301 However, the reconstituted Court did not entirely change
direction, but in some areas, engaged in even more aggressive action than
its predecessor.302
F. The Burger Court and Roe v. Wade
Early on the Burger Court in Furman v. Georgia 303 (with all four Nixon
appointees dissenting) invalidated the death penalty as it then stood in all
jurisdictions. Justice Marshall asserted that the death penalty was out of step
with modern sensibilities and that few if any states would reenact it.304 He
could not have been more wrong. Within a year of the decision, nearly half
the states had reenacted the death penalty.305 This is a stunning example
of how at least one justice, if not a majority of the Court, was badly out of
step with public opinion and sensibilities. It is also an excellent example of
an adverse political response to an unpopular decision. In one particular
area, the right to privacy, the Court ventured far beyond anything that that
the Warren Court had done to the severe detriment of its reputation. In
301. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (noting the exclusionary rule does not
apply where the police relied in good faith on a search warrant subsequently ruled invalid); see also
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (permitting warrantless full body search pursuant
to a custodial arrest); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (establishing there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to number on checks provided to bank); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (declaring statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona can be
admitted for impeachment of a witness); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding a
person invited to the police station and who was told he was suspected in a burglary was not in custody
and thus was not entitled to Miranda warnings); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980) (ruling
conversation between officers in a squad car with arrested subject did not constitute interrogation
invoking Miranda warnings); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (limiting the right to presence
of counsel to post-indictment lineups); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973) (ruling that right
to counsel does not apply to photographic identification).
302. See generally, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN’T vii
(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (“[W]hat has happened to those controversial Warren Court Doctrines? They
are more securely rooted now than they were in 1969 . . . .”).
303. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 278 (1972).
304. Id. at 369.
305. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 287.
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Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, the Warren Court first recognized a
constitutional right of privacy to invalidate an archaic Connecticut law
prohibiting married couples from using contraceptives.306 The Burger
Court employed the right of privacy to challenge laws of far greater
contemporary significance. In Eisenstadt v. Baird 307 decided in 1972, the
Court uncoupled the right to privacy from the marital relationship and
extended it to the individual.308 In Eisenstadt, employing equal protection
analysis, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting the
distribution of a contraceptive device to an unmarried person.309 Eisenstadt
paved the way to Roe v. Wade 310 which was already on the Court’s docket.
After two separate oral arguments, neither of which was particularly
competent, the Court issued its opinion in Roe v. Wade, surely the most
divisive and controversial decision of the Court since Dred Scott. Roe, along
with the companion case of Doe v. Bolton,311 effectively invalidated the
abortion laws of almost all states. Unlike Griswold, in which Justice Douglas
had struggled mightily to avoid resting the decision on the presumptively
discredited doctrine of substantive due process, Justice Blackmun in Roe
embraced substantive due process liberty as the constitutional source of the
right to privacy.312 Were it not for Roe v. Wade, there might be no present
firestorm surrounding the Court, or at least it would be far more muted. Roe
created a never-ending controversy in at least three respects.
First, by tackling the abortion issue at all, the Court entered an endless
whirlpool of controversy from which there was no escape. Too much was
at stake—life or no life. There was no room for compromise although the
Court seemed to think it could find one. For many persons on both sides
of the debate, this is an issue. For some, this is the issue that evokes extreme
passion and a desire to fight to the bitter end.313 As William Eskridge has
observed, “Roe was a threat to our democracy because it raised the stakes of
306. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (“[Marriage] deal[s] with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system.”).
307. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
308. Id. at 453.
309. Id. (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into a matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”) (emphasis in original).
310. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
311. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
312. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
313. Id. at 116 (acknowledging the emotion laden nature of the abortion question). However,
it is doubtful that Justice Blackmun understood the depth of emotion that the decision would provoke.
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an issue where primordial loyalties ran deep.”314 He continued by saying:
“Pro-life Americans behaved as though they had been disowned by this
country. And to a certain extent they had been.”315
Second, the Court’s substantive due process theory revealed that the
Court had no solid basis in law for its decision and that it was simply relying
on nothing more than its own conception of sound public policy.316 As
John Hart Ely wrote in his classic critique of the case, the opinion in Roe
was “not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to
try to be.”317
Third, the Court attempted to resolve a question that even it seemed to
recognize was incapable of judicial resolution—at least on a principled
constitutional basis—when a fetus becomes a human being deserving legal
if not constitutional protection. Justice Blackmun seemed to recognize that
this question was beyond legal competence but then purported to answer it
by fiat, as he must, once the Court decided to address the abortion issue at
all. Initially, he wrote:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.318

Surely, Justice Blackmun meant the Court could not resolve the issue of
when a fetus becomes a constitutional person since there can be no question
that a fetus is a form of life from conception on. However, in this quotation,
Justice Blackmun gave away his case, as lawyers would say, by admitting that
the judiciary cannot resolve the central issue. Then Texas should win since
it had resolved the issue. Nonetheless, Blackmun was not finished. After
briefly discussing the divergence of views on the question of when a fetus
becomes a person, Blackmun declared “we do not agree that, by adopting
one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman

314. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering
the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE. L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005).
315. Id.
316. See BORK, supra note 83, at 43 (“[A] judge who insists on giving the due process clause
such content must make it up.”).
317. Ely, supra note 83, at 947.
318. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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that are at stake.”319 However, he recognized that the state had a legitimate
and important interest in protecting “potentiality of human life.”320
Blackmun chose the line of viability (the point at which the fetus can survive
outside of the womb) as the point at which the state’s interest in the
protection of potential human life could override the woman’s right to an
abortion (at least as long as giving birth did not endanger the woman’s life
or health).321 After declaring the judiciary was unable to draw the line,
Justice Blackmun proceeded to draw the line by substituting potential life
for life. No one was fooled by this clumsy maneuver. Justice Blackmun
had admitted that the abortion controversy could not be resolved on a
principled basis, much less on a principled basis grounded in constitutional
law, and then proceeded to resolve it anyway. Quite transparently, it was
simply not the Court’s proper role to resolve troubling social, cultural, or
political controversies through naked interest balancing devoid of any preexisting legal or constitutional support.322
Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, compared the Court’s decision,
based as it was on substantive due process, to the infamous decision in
Lochner v. New York.323 Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, characterized
the Court’s opinion as “an exercise of raw judicial power” with “scarcely any
reason or authority for its action . . . .”324 Following Professor Ely’s
influential article savaging the opinion in Roe, other leading legal academics,
including many who sympathized with the result in Roe, joined in criticism
of the opinion. Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School wrote
that the decision “lacked significant support in conventional sources of
law.”325 Gerald Gunther of the Stanford Law School, and author of the
most widely used Constitutional Law casebook, declared, “I have not yet
found a satisfying rationale to justify Roe v. Wade, the abortion ruling, on the

319. Id. at 162.
320. Id.
321. Id.; see also CLARKE FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF
ROE V. WADE 127 (2013) (noting viability had not been mentioned in either the briefs, including the
amicus briefs, or the oral arguments of Roe v. Wade).
322. See Tom Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority:
The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 781 (1994) (illustrating, according
to a telephone survey conducted in the San Francisco Bay area, a “majority of respondents indicated
that the Supreme Court should have less authority to determine public policy over the abortion issue”).
323. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174.
324. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
325. COX, supra note 147, at 334.
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basis of modes of constitutional interpretation I consider legitimate.”326
Judge Bork wrote that Roe did not contain “one sentence that qualifies as
legal argument.”327 Dean Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School
characterized Roe as “offensive” and a “disaster.”328 Professor Mark
Tushnet, who had served as Justice Marshall’s law clerk when Roe was
decided, characterized it as “a new art form,” “the totally unreasoned judicial
opinion.”329 Professor Richard Fallon of the Harvard Law School stated
that the Roe opinion was “puzzling, disappointing and almost embarrassing
to read” and that it was “bereft of reasoned argument.”330 Judge Henry
Friendly observed that the Court had failed “to articulate a defensible
principle.”331 And there was so much more.332 The gist of the academic
criticism made two points. First, the opinion in Roe applied no discernable
principles of law to defend its result. Second, and relatedly, the Court went
far beyond its proper role in attempting to resolve an issue that could only
be resolved politically.
The public reaction to Roe was perhaps slow in developing, given that
former President Johnson died on the day the opinion was announced,
capturing the immediate news cycle. However, protests and counter
protests soon materialized. As Archibald Cox noted, “no decision other
than Dred Scott has aroused as intense emotion.”333
By taking one side on the abortion issue, the Court stepped into
quicksand from which it might be impossible to extricate itself. The Court’s
only path to salvation would have been to avoid deciding the case on the
326. Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817, 819 (1979).
327. BORK, supra note 83, at 112.
328. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 93–97 (1985).
329. MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (1988).
330. RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2001).
331. Henry Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21,
35 (1978).
332. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE
SEVENTIES 30 (1979) (“Political pragmatism, not constitutional principle, appeared to be the raison
d’être of The Abortion Cases.”); see also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81 (1991) (“Roe gave legal reasoning a bad name.”);
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 28 (1975) (In Roe, the Court “simply asserted
the result it reached.”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA 82 (2006) (arguing Roe “was a political and constitutional mistake” because of judicial
“unilateralism”).
333. COX, supra note 147, at 322.
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merits entirely. However, once the Court found a constitutional right to
abortion, it created a constituency that would continue to demand
protection of that right and would endorse the value oriented non-legalistic
methodology that produced the decision. Roe convinced a significant
segment of the public that the Supreme Court’s proper role was to provide
a trump card that could be played to invalidate any state or federal law that
could not be repealed through the political process.334 As of Roe, at least
for many, the Supreme Court had become Santa Claus and any vision of the
Court or methodology that threatened the Court’s role as supreme political
actor became threatening to “democracy.”
Immediately after Roe, several states passed legislation testing the limits
of the decision. In the decade following Roe, the Court defended the
decision vigorously, invalidating most laws that had the effect of
undermining it with the exception of state and federal laws prohibiting
public funding of abortion.335 Given the Court’s continued support for
Roe, Supreme Court confirmation hearings did not for the most part turn on
the potential for overruling Roe. That changed near the end of the 1980s.
Roe had been decided by a seven-to-two majority. As new Justices were
appointed, apparent support on the Court for Roe declined from six to three,
then five to four, until finally the Webster case in 1989 when it appeared there
might be a majority to overrule Roe.336
The other event that crystalized the public controversy over the
continued survival of Roe was the unsuccessful nomination of Judge Robert
Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987. As a law professor, Bork had been
highly critical of Griswold v. Connecticut, the less controversial precursor of Roe

334. FRIED, supra note 331, at 87 (“[A]bortion has distorted public attitudes and expectations
about the Supreme Court.”).
335. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71–75 (1976) (invalidating requirements
of parental and spousal consent); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,
452 (1983) (invalidating requirement that post first trimester abortions be performed in a hospital),
overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977) (upholding prohibition of public funding for medically unnecessary abortions where childbirth
costs for indigents were paid by the state); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding a
federal law prohibiting federal funding for some medically necessary abortions).
336. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537–38 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how close the opinion was to overturning Roe). Webster involved a Missouri law
that was designed to present a direct challenge to Roe. Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for a four-justice
plurality was prepared to overrule Roe. Justice O’Connor, the fifth vote, concluded that the statute
could be upheld without reconsidering Roe. Id.

2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS?

357

v. Wade.337 The supporters of Roe recognized that Judge Bork would
probably be the crucial fifth vote to overrule Roe. Judge Bork’s explicit
views on the illegitimacy of the right to privacy played a significant role in
the defeat of his nomination.338 After the highly publicized Bork hearings,
Supreme Court confirmation hearings—at least for nominees who might be
inclined to vote to overrule or at least substantially narrow Roe—would
never again be the same. The year before the Bork hearings, Justice Antonin
Scalia, who proved to be a vigorous opponent of Roe, had been confirmed
by a unanimous vote of the Senate.
One of the puzzling considerations surrounding the recent debate over
whether Roe should or will be overruled is that it was, in fact, partially
overruled over twenty-five years earlier in Planned Parenthood of Southern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.339 For years, the Department of Justice urged the
Court to reconsider and overrule Roe. Finally, in Casey, the Court agreed to
consider and address that issue. In order to save Roe from being completely
overruled, the Joint Opinion of Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor,
replaced the strict scrutiny standard of review—which would ordinarily
apply in a case involving a fundamental right—with the undue burden test.
In other words, a law regulating abortion would only be unconstitutional if
it intended or had the effect of imposing an undue burden on the woman’s
right to obtain an abortion.340 In Roe, the Court took on an issue which it
could not adjudicate in a principled manner and in Casey, it rendered it even
more subjective. As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, what constituted
an undue burden was very much in the eye of the beholder.341 Thus a judge
sympathetic to the abortion right can find that virtually all regulation creates
an undue burden. A judge unsympathetic to the right will rarely find that
good faith abortion regulation creates an undue burden. Consequently,
337. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J 1, 7–11
(1971) (opining how the substantive due process doctrine used in Griswold has always been improper).
338. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 540–544
(1989) (“There is no way to tell exactly how much Judge Bork's persistent attacks on Griswold
contributed to his rejection by the Senate; however, it is fair to say that it was a significant factor.
Griswold was a useful case for Judge Bork’s opponents because its general right to privacy . . . . The
opposition portrayed Judge Bork as a threat to privacy . . . .”).
339. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
340. See id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
341. Id. at 986 (“[T]he standard is inherently manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable
in practice.”).
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Casey contained the seeds of the ultimate effective rejection of Roe by
providing the Court with the tools to narrow and minimize Roe without
explicitly overruling it. At least for public relations purposes, the defenders
of Roe proceed as if it still existed unaltered, but that has not been the case
for over two decades. By deciding Roe, the Court created large and active
constituencies both favoring and opposing the continuing existence of the
decision. The Court has painted itself into a corner from which it cannot
easily escape. Whatever it does with respect to a constitutionally based
abortion right will cause millions of Americans to rebel against the Court.
That cannot be said of any other contemporary decision. This is a very
precarious position for the Court to have placed itself in.
G. The Rehnquist Court
Like the Burger Court before it, the Rehnquist Court was not as
conservative in ideology as it has often been portrayed.342 Having
rediscovered the substantive due process methodology, the Court made use
of it in socially controversial areas, especially gay rights. In Lawrence v.
Texas,343 the Court employed substantive due process to invalidate a Texas
criminal law which prohibited homosexual sodomy, even within the
confines of the home.344 The result was not particularly controversial
because a few states maintained such laws and those that did rarely enforced
them. Lawrence was troublesome in at least three respects, however. First,
there was a serious question whether the validity of such laws was any of
the Court’s business, as would be the case whenever the Court relied on
substantive due process to invalidate a law. Second, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, seemed to reject public morality as a legitimate
police power interest by equating it with nothing more than prejudice.345
For over a century, federal courts had characterized morality as one of the
legitimate ends of the police power.346 Finally, Lawrence was seen as a
342. See Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 186 (reporting between 57% and 64% of the
Rehnquist Court’s decisions are characterized as liberal).
343. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For an excellent discussion of the history of the
case, see DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (1st ed.
2012) (summarizing the specific details behind the Lawrence decision).
344. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
345. Id. at 571.
346. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (“[The police power] extends to all
matters affecting the public health or the public morals.”); Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois,
200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that the police power of a state embraces . . . regulations designed
to promote the public health, public morals, or the public safety.”).
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doctrinal step in the invalidation of laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. The
majority denied that this was where the decision would lead.347
Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that that was exactly the intended result.348
He proved to be correct.
There are two Rehnquist Court decisions that critics of the conservative
majority on the Court have assailed, neither of which have led to a legitimacy
crisis. The first is Bush v. Gore.349 The 2000 presidential race resolution
turned on a recount of Florida’s votes, where George W. Bush held a slight
lead.350 Democrat candidate Al Gore sought the aid of the Florida courts
to alter the rules governing the recount.351 The Florida Supreme Court
complied.352 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States
intervened at the behest of Bush by first halting the manual recount353 and
then concluding that the lack of uniform standards rendered such a recount
to violate equal protection of the laws. Given the safe harbor deadline’s
imminence, there simply was insufficient time to devise a standard and
resume the recount.354 Consequently, given that Bush still held a slim lead,
he won the Florida electoral vote and the presidency.
The majority’s legal basis for its equal protection result was thin.
However, the decision was best explained by Justice Stevens’s dissent,
which contended that “[w]hat must underlie petitioners’ entire federal
assault on the Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence
in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the
critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed.”355 Stevens was exactly
correct. Chief Justice Wells of the Florida Supreme Court, dissenting from
the majority’s decision to change the vote count deadline, had charged that
there was “no foundation in the law of Florida” for that decision.356 As
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer indicated after the fact, they had
347. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
348. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
349. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
350. Id. at 100.
351. Id.
352. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. SC00-2346, No. SC00-2347, No. SC002348, 2000 WL 1716480 (Fla. Nov. 17, 2000).
353. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 1046, 1047 (2000).
354. Id. at 122.
355. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
356. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 531 U.S.
98 (2000).
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concluded that the Florida Supreme Court could not be trusted to fairly and
competently resolve a dispute involving the election of the next President
of the United States.357
Democrats, especially law professors, were furious and charged that by
intervening and effectively deciding a presidential election, the Court had
tarnished its image with the public irreparably. Some portrayed Bush v. Gore
as a fatal blow to the Court’s legitimacy as an institution.358 Law professors
were as critical of the reasoning of Bush v. Gore as they had been of Roe v.
Wade.359 However, these dire predictions were not realized.360 There were
hard feelings for a short period, but these dissipated with time.
The predicted blow to the Court’s legitimacy as an institution failed to
materialize.361 The public was tired of the continued conflict over the
election and accepted its resolution by the Court. The Court’s opinion
in Bush v. Gore could be criticized as light on legal principle and that
the Court should have given Florida one final opportunity to complete
the recount; however, while a 5–4 decision by a majority appointed
by Republican presidents might appear politically partisan, the decision
had little—if any—long-term impact on the Court’s institutional credibility
with the general public. Not only did the decision fail to erode public
support for the Court, public support for the Court reached a higher
level in the year following the decision than recorded in the recent
357. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 31–32 (2007) (noting
Justice O’Connor remarks that the Florida Supreme Court was “off on a trip of its own”); see also id.
at 176 (stating Justice Kennedy “would later explain that the outcome had to do with bringing a
renegade court to heal”); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 165 (2007) (quoting how Justice Breyer “didn’t
like what the Florida Supreme Court had done. To him, the justices in Tallahassee looked like they
were trying too hard to help Gore.”).
358. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 775 (voicing claims by legal academics that the decision
undermined the Court’s legitimacy).
359. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1083–86 (2001) (critiquing the analysis of Bush v. Gore as political, not legal); James L.
Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election
of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCI. 535, 535–36 (2003) (“585 law
professors placed an advertisement in the New York Times on 13 January 2001, condemning the
Court’s decision as illegitimate.”).
360. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 776–78 (explaining why the decision in Bush v. Gore did not
threaten the Court’s legitimacy with the public).
361. FRIEDMAN, supra note 147, at 358 (asserting 61% of the public believed that the Court
should have resolved the election dispute); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 177 (2007); Gibson &
Caldeira, supra note 12, at 199; Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra note 358, at 546 (“Most Americans
(62.4 percent) believe that the Court based its decision on the legal merits of the case, not on the
[J]ustices’ desire to see Bush become president.”).
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past.362 The election was a mess, so it needed to be resolved. The Court’s
intervention brought it to a quick conclusion, which is probably what the
general public desired. Unlike Roe, the decision resolved a once in a lifetime
dispute unlikely to occur again. Bush v. Gore well illustrates the strength of
the diffuse support for the Court. Given the onslaught of academic and
media criticism of the decision, as Professor Fuentes-Rohwer asked: “If this
case did not harm the Court’s legitimacy in any noticeable way, will any case
ever will?”363
A second hot-button case decided by the Roberts Court was District of
Columbia v. Heller,364 where the Court comprehensively addressed the
meaning of the Second Amendment. The underlying issue, whether the
Second Amendment recognized a constitutional right to possess firearms
for self-defense, was politically controversial since such a right would render
gun control efforts more difficult.365 However, the case was not
controversial since its resolution was entirely dependent on lawyers’ work.
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority with Justice Stevens dissenting contributed
one of the finest examples of textual and originalist analysis. While
individuals may continue to disagree with Justices Scalia or Stevens, there is
no room to argue that they or any other Justice was acting beyond the scope
of appropriate judicial conduct.366 Rather, both were deciding a difficult
constitutional case by applying tools that lawyers and judges had
traditionally employed to decide such cases. The public seemed to
understand that even though it paid little attention to the details. Despite
severe political disagreement regarding gun control, there is no reason to
believe that Heller undermined the legitimacy of the Court with the public.
362. Gibson, supra note 42, at 520 (reporting, in 1995, 65% of the public believed the Court
could be trusted, and, in 2001—the year after Bush v. Gore—public trust rose to 78%).
363. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 10, at 511; see also Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra note 358,
at 553 (“[E]ven an enormously controversial decision like Bush v. Gore has little if any influence on
institutional loyalty.”).
364. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
365. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Gun Control Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/washington/20cnd-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/
DE3V-SWBZ] (“[L]awyers on both sides of the case agreed today that a victory for the plaintiff in this
case would amount to the opening chapter in an examination of the constitutionality of gun control
rather than anything close to the final word.”).
366. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Ruling 5–4, Endorse Personal Right to Own Gun, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotus.html [https://perma.
cc/X66Q-9S62] (examining the strained arguments in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in that neither relied on already expounded legal principles but
rather only their personal reading of the Second Amendment).
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Yet another controversial case decided by the Rehnquist Court was Kelo v.
City of New London.367 In a 5–4 decision, the Court held the city’s taking of
private property for a private party included in a redevelopment project
intended to benefit the economy would constitute “public use” under the
Takings Clause.368 The decision was consistent with the precedent but
arguably not with the text. The case gave rise to a massive counter-reaction
by the public, resulting in laws in most states prohibiting condemnation
authority to transfer property from one private owner to another.369 This
readily available political remedy for those dissatisfied with the decision is
likely the reason the decision did not result in a loss of the Court’s legitimacy.
Still, Kelo is a stunning example of significant political backlash against a
Supreme Court decision in action.
H. The Roberts Court
Several decisions of the Roberts Court have also raised concerns with at
least some segments of the public as to the Court’s legitimacy. Citizens United
v. FEC, which pitted First Amendment freedom of speech against campaign
finance legislation, became a rallying cry for the Court’s opponents.370 Like
gun control in Heller, this implicated a controversial partisan issue. In
Citizens United, the Court, by a 5–4 majority invalidated an Act of Congress
prohibiting corporations or unions from purchasing with general funds
campaign advertising to endorse a candidate on electronic media within 30
days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election.371 The decision
was politically controversial, resulting in a rebuke from President Obama
during the State of the Union address.372 Considering that the Court relied
on constitutionally based principles of freedom of speech, the case did not
raise questions about the Court’s legitimacy other than with the ultra-

367. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
368. Id. at 479–480 (“[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at
the close of the 19th [C]entury, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use
as ‘public purpose.’”).
369. See 50 State Report Card, CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-reportcard [https://perma.cc/N5AV-FVFQ] (“In the two years since the U.S. Supreme Court’s nowinfamous decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 44 states have passed new laws aimed at curbing the
abuse of eminent domain for private use.”).
370. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010).
371. Id. at 336–37 (“[A] statute which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial
invalidity has been demonstrated.”).
372. TOOBIN, supra note 6, at 196–197.
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partisan Democratic party elite who used opposition to Citizens United as a
fundraising tool.373
Critics attacked the ruling on the ground that it allowed corporate money
to influence elections.374 This was a red herring. Apart from the decision,
wealthy individuals had the right to spend vast sums of money to hopefully
influence elections. Critics of Citizens United were motivated by its rejection
of the theory that it was permissible for the government to level the playing
field concerning political speech funding.375 The Citizens United Court
made it clear that such a theory was completely inconsistent with the
First Amendment.376 That, in a nutshell, is why Citizens United remains a
thorn in the side of those who desire greater governmental regulation of
electoral speech.
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,377 the Court by a
5–4 vote upheld the constitutionality of the mandate to purchase insurance
as an aspect of the Affordable Care Act.378 Five Justices—including
Chief Justice Roberts—held that Congress lacked authority to enact the
mandate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the primary basis for the
legislation.379 This upset those who believed that Congress did have such
power or that the scope of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause was beyond the purview of judicial authority. However,
Chief Justice Roberts voted to uphold the mandate because Congress could
have enacted it under the taxing power.380 That distressed those who
believed that the mandate was beyond congressional authority and that

373. Dave Levinthal, How ‘Citizens United’ is helping Hillary Clinton win the White House, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY [https://perma.cc/JJ5Q-CR7Z] (investigating several Democratic party leaders’,
including then presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, stance on an election reform-centric platform
following the Citizens United decision).
374. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Money Is Speech: Why the Citizens United v. FEC Ruling Is Bad for
Politics and the Market, DISSENT (Mar. 3, 2010) [https://perma.cc/7C4A-VYK9] (“If economic
incumbents—those who were successful in the past—are able to use their current wealth to influence
elections and indirectly buy laws that will assure them future wealth, the market will fail just as surely
as democracy would fail if political incumbents were permitted to use their offices to control
elections.”).
375. Jonathan E. Skrabacz, Note, “Leveling the Playing Field”: Reconsidering Campaign Finance Reform
in the Wake of Arizona Free Enterprise, 32 SAINT LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 487, 488 (“[C]ases [such as
Citizens United] that have rejected the idea of leveling the playing field have been off the mark.”).
376. Id. at 489 n.15.
377. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
378. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575 (2012).
379. Id. at 552, 646–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
380. Id. at 563.
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Chief Justice Roberts had simply yielded to political and media pressure.
One explanation for Chief Justice Roberts’s surprising decision to save the
mandate is that he was attempting to preserve the Court’s institutional
integrity by preventing it from becoming an issue in the 2012 presidential
campaign. If that was in fact Roberts’s goal, he clearly succeeded. The
Affordable Care Act’s constitutionality was an important issue for some, but
there is no evidence Sebelius endangered the Court’s legitimacy with the
public.
True to Justice Scalia’s prediction in his Lawrence dissent, in Obergefell v.
Hodges, the Court again relied primarily on substantive due process to
invalidate state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and their refusal to
recognize the legality of same-sex marriages performed in other states.381
As with prior gay rights cases, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion,
which was bereft of traditional legal analysis. Unlike Lawrence, Obergefell
presented a much more deeply divisive cultural issue.382 At the time of the
decision, same-sex marriage had been legislatively authorized in several
states, although it was clear that it would be resisted in many others. As
with any substantive due process decision, the opponents of the result could
ask on what basis the Court invalidated a longstanding law that had
traditionally been deemed well within the states’ domain. It seemed like a
clear instance of the Court taking sides in an existing culture war as
Justice Scalia had charged in an earlier gay rights case.383
Like Roe, Obergefell raised serious questions concerning the Court’s
legitimacy. Instead of doing “lawyers’ work,” the Court appeared to be
entering a political/cultural fray to deliver a result that was deeply desired
by some but simply could not be readily achieved through the political
process. A successful appeal to the Court provided an argument ender.
Prior to the decision, there was public debate. After the decision, the issue
was definitively settled, and the only debate remaining was whether it was
proper for the Court to intervene.384 Although the recognition of same-

381. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675, 681 (2015).
382. Justin McCarthy, Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (May 19,
2015),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GF6P-QTUG] (noting support of same-sex marriage is much less among
Republicans than Democrats).
383. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
384. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 686 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“Whether same-sex marriage is a
good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the
law is, not what it should be.”).
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sex marriage, especially by judicial decree, was deeply troubling to a
significant segment of the public, the decision did not in itself significantly
threaten the Court’s legitimacy, partially because many states had been
moving in the direction of the result anyway.385 Moreover, like Bush v. Gore,
it may have been an issue that the public simply wanted to be resolved and
removed from the political agenda. Although the decision may not have
eroded public support for the Court, it was almost certainly one that played
a role in a large portion of the voting public in 2016 that a change in the
Court’s analytical approach, as well as its results, was warranted.
Donald Trump made the Supreme Court an issue in the 2016 presidential
campaign by publishing a list of names from which he would choose future
nominees to fill the vacancy created by the death of Justice Scalia, as well as
to fill future vacancies should they occur.386 In February 2016,
Justice Scalia had died unexpectedly. Senate leader Mitch McConnell took
an extreme risk in holding a Supreme Court seat open to be filled by the
winner of the presidential election, given that it was widely assumed that
Hillary Clinton would win the election and hence be in a position to fill the
vacant seat on the Court. President Obama nominated respected circuit
Judge Merrick Garland; however, McConnell refused to hold a hearing on
the nomination.
This qualifies as what Professor Mark Tushnet characterizes as
“constitutional hardball.”387 Hillary Clinton had every opportunity to
campaign on filling the seat as vigorously as Donald Trump. But the voters
heard Donald Trump’s proclamation to nominate conservative judges, and
while the Supreme Court was hardly the only issue that affected the election,
it was certainly a significant issue.388 It appears for those who considered
the Supreme Court a reason to vote, the nomination of a conservative
justice, from a list provided to Trump by the Federalist Society, carried more
influence in the voting booth than the prospective nomination of a

385. See McCarthy, supra note 380 (reporting sixty percent of Americans being in outright
support of same-sex marriages).
386. HULSE, supra note 2, at 2–3.
387. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 534–36 (2004)
(describing “constitutional hardball” as practices which fall within the boundaries of existing
constitutional doctrine but are in tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings).
388. See Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump Offers Conservatives a Deal on Supreme Court, TIME (Mar. 21,
2016), https://time.com/4266700/donald-trump-supreme-court-nominations [https://perma.cc/
YHV3-HGDV] (“Trump . . . is offering conservatives a pretty sweet [deal]: He’ll give up some of the
independence that a president normally has on judicial nominations if they’ll stay on his side.”).
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moderate, liberal, or progressive nominee by Hillary Clinton.389
That strategy succeeded in attracting voters.390 There is a general
agreement that Trump would not have won the election had he not taken
the bold and controversial step of publishing the list.391 For at least a
quarter of Trump’s voters, it was the primary reason they supported him.392
When vacancies did occur, including the opportunity to fill the seat of
Justice Scalia held open from the previous year, President Trump chose two
nominees from the list as augmented, both of whom were confirmed and
now sit on the Court. Now, President Trump has named another nominee
from an approved list who has likewise been confirmed. The election of
President Trump was the latest example of how the constitutional
appointment process responds to a degree of public dissatisfaction with the
Court and thereby tempering any question about the Court’s legitimacy.
I.

The Reconstituted Roberts Court

So far, at least three cases have been the focus of controversy by the
President Trump’s opponents. The first was Trump v. Hawaii 393 decided in
2018. The Court upheld President Trump’s travel ban by a 5–4 majority
with respect to entry from eight countries that the United States had
concluded did not satisfy sufficient security-vetting processes. Several
district courts had enjoined the Executive Order. The majority held that the
Order fell within the authority delegated to the President by Congress.394
The majority also rejected the claim that the Order was intended to
discriminate against Muslims.395 Although President Trump’s opponents
howled at the decision, there is no reason to believe the decision
389. Citizens exercised their rights to vote for the person they believed would best uphold and
implement their ideals and values. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 358, at 1102 (“[E]ach party has
the political ‘right’ to entrench its vision of the Constitution in the judiciary if it wins a sufficient number
of elections. If others don’t like the constitutional vision that results, they have the equal right to go
out and win some elections of their own.”); see also Baum & Devins, supra note 37, at 1522 (“The
appointments and confirmation process is the most direct way that elected officials put their
imprimatur on Court decision making.”).
390. See CHARLES HURT, STILL WINNING: WHY AMERICA WENT ALL IN ON DONALD
TRUMP—AND WHY WE MUST DO IT AGAIN 163 (2019) (indicating the list “prove[d] to be one of
the biggest issues that got Trump elected”); HULSE, supra note 2, at 289 (“Trump would almost
certainly not have won the presidency without that open court seat.”).
391. HULSE, supra note 2, at 1, 56, 147, 152–53.
392. HEMINGWAY & SEVERINO, supra note 2, at 59.
393. Trump v. Hawaii,138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
394. Id. at 2408.
395. Id. at 2421.
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undermined the Court’s credibility with the public. Trump had campaigned
vigorously on the need for a travel ban. Indeed, many of his statements in
the campaign became an issue in the case. Since the result in the case,
upholding the travel ban was consistent with Trump’s position during his
successful presidential campaign, it is unlikely that the decision would
undermine the Court’s reputation with a significant swath of the public
despite its unpopularity with Trump’s partisan opponents.
In 2019, the Court decided two politically controversial cases on the final
day of its term. In Rucho v. Common Cause,396 the Court finally held that legal
challenges to partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts constituted
political questions beyond the scope of federal judicial authority due to the
absence of judicially manageable standards. A four-vote plurality had
endorsed that approach in Vieth v. Jubelirer.397 Justice Kavanaugh, replacing
Justice Kennedy, provided the crucial fifth vote. Democrats complained,
but the public at large did not seem to care. Evaluating partisan
gerrymandering legally presented a classic political question due to the
absence of judicially manageable standards, even more so than
reapportionment. There remains hope that Rucho will reinvigorate the
political question doctrine after it was unduly diminished in Baker v. Carr.
In Department of Commerce v. New York,398 the other case decided on the
final day of the term, a 5–4 majority held that the Secretary of Commerce
could not add a question for the recipient’s citizenship to the short form of
the census because the Secretary’s explanation for the addition was
pretextual. A media campaign followed the decision, arguing that a decision
in favor of the Secretary (and hence President Trump) would threaten the
legitimacy of the Court.399 The Court prevented the Secretary from adding
the question. Since the issue was quite technical, the public probably would
not have cared much one way or the other. The “legitimacy” argument is
beginning to lose its punch if it ever had any.

396. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
397. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004).
398. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
399. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020) (“[T]hese cases involve . . .
straightforward application of legal terms . . . . For . . . discriminat[ion] against employees for being
homosexual or transgender . . . discriminate[s] against individual men and women in part because of
sex. That has always been prohibited by Title VII’s plain terms . . . .”).

368

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:285

V. DOES THE COURT CURRENTLY HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS?
On several occasions, the Court has gotten out of step with the public.
The Court’s diffuse support permits it to decide cases against the grain of
public opinion for some time. However, when the public becomes too
dissatisfied with the Court and its decisions, the political check of
nomination and confirmation of new Justices will change its direction. This
occurred over dissatisfaction with the Marshall Court’s federalism decisions,
the Taney Court’s Dred Scott decision, the Lochner era decisions of the first
third of the twentieth century, and the Warren Court’s aggressive decisions
in civil rights. In each instance, the newly constituted Court changed
directions trimming back the jurisprudence of the prior Court. Given life
tenure for the Justices, the likelihood of strategic retirements, and the
probability of sporadic vacancies on the Court, replacement of Justices will
often occur unpredictably. Nevertheless, given human mortality, vacancies
on the Court will occur. If the public is sufficiently dissatisfied with the
Court over a lengthy period of time, a President and Senate will eventually
be in place to appoint Justices who will alter the Court’s direction. It may
seem like happenstance, however, that the appointment of Justices has
resolved potential legitimacy crises short of more powerful options
including defiance, court packing, limitation of jurisdiction, impeachment,
or partial elimination of the Court.
A lack of a political consensus in favor of altering the Court’s direction
should not matter. In most political choices, the majority rules. Just as there
will be political forces favoring change, there almost certainly will be
counterforces favoring the status quo. If the forces favoring a change in the
Court’s direction prevail politically, they have the constitutional right to
nominate and confirm Justices likely to move the Court in a new or different
direction.
Arguably, that is what has happened over the past few years. Nominating
textualist/originalist judges from a published list was a crucial piece of
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. That proposal appealed to a
significant swath of the electorate. Hillary Clinton responded with her
approach, proclaiming that she would appoint Justices who would preserve
Roe v. Wade and reject Citizens United.400 It seems that Court appointments
resonates to a greater extent with Republican and conservative voters than

400. HULSE, supra note 2, at 148.
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with Democratic and liberal voters.401 Perhaps this is because conservative
voters perceive some of the Court’s decisions to be hostile to their basic
values, particularly cultural and religious issues.402 To some extent,
abortion and Roe v. Wade serve as a proxy for broader cultural issues.
Conservatives are more likely to disagree with the Court’s resolution of
these issues and are more likely to question whether deciding these cases is
any of the Court’s business. Conservative voters are also likely to be more
receptive to arguments claiming the Constitution should be interpreted
according to the original understanding of the text and not based on judicial
assumptions of wise policy. This was the approach that candidate Trump
took, and it seemed to resonate with enough voters to lead to his election.
As has often been the case, the public avoided a true legitimacy crisis with
respect to the Court by electing a President and Senate committed to using
the appointment and confirmation process to alter the Court’s direction.403
This entails altering interpretive approaches and specific results, as has
happened on several occasions in the past. The appointment and
confirmation process assumes that the President, with the Senate’s
concurrence, may alter the direction of the Court. If precedent restricted
the Justices to interpret the law precisely as it had always been interpreted
in the past, judicial confirmation hearings would be far simpler. Senators
would simply need assurance from the nominee that the Justice would
continue to decide cases exactly as the Court had done in the past. Under
such an approach, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and Betts v. Brady
would still be the law. Precedent matters. It constrains without controlling
for all time. The Court can change directions, and it is entirely appropriate
for the President and Senate to nudge it in the direction of change. Those
401. Haglin et al., supra note 44, at 30–31; see TOOBIN, supra note 360, at 338 (indicating
conservatives “cared more about the Court than their liberal counterparts”). Ronald Reagan had also
employed the prospect of conservative judicial appointments to increase political support. Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
373, 381 (2007).
402. See NELSON & TUCKER, supra note 84, at 30 (showing a 2015 poll by Pew indicated that
68% of conservative Republicans considered the Roberts Court liberal); Fontana & Braman, supra
note 85, at 765–76 (stating conservatives are more motivated to vote than liberals based on Court
decisions that either support or conflict with their values); TOOBIN, supra note 360, at 86 (stating
evangelical Christens were activated by Supreme Court decisions secularizing constitutional law);
Eskridge Jr., supra note 313, at 1312 (“Not only did Roe energize the pro-life movement and accelerate
the infusion of sectarian religion into American politics, but it also radicalized many traditionalists.”).
403. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 358, at 1083 (“It is perfectly normal for Presidents to
entrench members of their party in the judiciary as a means of shaping constitutional interpretation.
That is the way most constitutional change occurs.”).
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who resist such change will cry “illegitimacy,” but this will be a political
argument tested in the political process.
Does the Court presently have a legitimacy crisis? Probably not. Diffuse
support for the Court remains strong despite anguished cries of illegitimacy
from those disappointed with changes in the Court’s membership and those
anxious about the Court’s future direction.404 History indicates that
controversial decisions that affect persons classified as elite do not
negatively impact public respect for the Court. However, there cannot be
multiple decisions over a relatively short period. The strength of that diffuse
support is illustrated by the fact that most of the public rejects many
significant constitutional doctrines and decisions of the Court over the past
several decades. The rejected decisions of the Court include protection of
abortion rights beyond the first trimester,405 the use of racial preferences in
college admissions to achieve diversity in the student body,406 expanded
protection for criminal defendants,407 the prohibition of prayer in the
public schools,408 protection of flag burning under the
First Amendment,409 judicially imposed limitations on the death
penalty,410 and the ability of municipalities to take private property and
convey it to a private developer.411 Even more significantly, the fact Bush
v. Gore, criticized by elites as one of the most illegitimate decisions of all
time, had no long-term impact on diffuse support for the Court is testimony
404. A 2003 survey found that “[n]early all Americans believe the Court is doing at least a pretty
good job, and most believe its policy positions are about right.” James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira
& Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. OF POL.
SCI. 354, 359 (2003); see also NELSON & TUCKER, supra note 84, at 30 (noting that despite polls
indicating a decline in support for the Court, empirical research shows that despite controversial
decisions on the Affordable Care Act, same-sex marriage, and affirmative action, diffuse support for
the Court remains strong).
405. SAMANTHA LUKS & MICHAEL SALAMONE, ABORTION, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 80 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan ed. 2008).
406. LOAN LEE & JACK CITRIN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 162, 181 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
407. AMY E. LERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 41, 56 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
408. ALISON GASH & ANGELO GONZALEZ, SCHOOL PRAYER, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62, 77 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
409. PETER HANSON, FLAG BURNING, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 184, 199 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
410. JOHN HANLEY, THE DEATH PENALTY, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 108, 135 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
411. JANICE NADLER ET AL., GOVERNMENT TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286, 304 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008).
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to the depth of that support. Indeed, the Court seems to be all but
bulletproof. All this suggests is current cries of illegitimacy are unlikely to
shake public support for the Court. There is some research suggesting that,
at least with respect to salient decisions inconsistent with public attitudes,
backlash against the decisions will fade over time resulting in public
acceptance.412 The extent the public remains in disagreement with so many
major decisions from the nineteen fifties, sixties, and seventies would seem
to undermine this thesis. This will especially be true with respect to
technical legal decisions of little interest to the general public.
The remedy for illegitimacy, defined as deep and widespread general
dissatisfaction with the Court, is political and exercised through the
appointment and confirmation power. No matter how intensely a particular
minority of citizens may disapprove of the direction of the Court, the claims
of illegitimacy will have no impact unless they can translate that disapproval
into viable political action capable of affecting presidential or senatorial
elections, or at least at the appointment and confirmation stage.
Was Justice Scalia correct? Would the Court’s failure to decide cases by
doing “lawyers’ work” seriously undermine public respect for the Court?
Considering the past instances in which the Court strayed too far from the
public’s views and values, he was partially correct. Most of the time, the
public is unaware of the Court’s decisions, much less its reasoning. As such,
there is slight prospect of negative public reaction against the Court.
However, every so often a judicial decision resonates with the public, as was
the case with abortion in Roe v. Wade, slavery in the territories in Dred Scott,
or regulation of economic affairs in the Lochner era. When that happens,
and when the public is paying attention, the Court is at grave risk—as
Justice Scalia argued—if it is deciding such crucial questions through the
transparent application of judicial value judgments rather than through the
traditional interpretive approaches that lawyers are trained to apply. In all
three instances cited above, the Court relied on the dubious device of
substantive due process. Even the uninitiated lay person can understand
that there is little legal substance to this concept and in fact it is simply a
facade for the imposition of value judgments rather than pre-existing legal
principles. Justice Scalia is surely correct in concluding that decisions based
412. Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court
Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 119 (2013) (“[T]he data indicate this initial backlash response
eventually decays and is ultimately replaced by public mood’s movement toward the ideological
direction of Supreme Court decisions.”).
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on substantive due process are likely to lead to trouble for the Court, as has
often been the case.
However, history has suggested the Court can seriously undermine its
public support even when it seems to be doing “lawyers’ work” by
attempting to resolve troubling questions that are simply incapable of
judicial resolution, even by the best application the lawyer’s craft has to
offer. M’Culloch v. Maryland provides an example. Marshall’s opinion in
M’Culloch is a masterpiece of legal reasoning. However, it attempted to
definitively resolve the proper relationship between the federal government
and the states, which was simply too big and divisive to be resolved by
judicial degree at that time. The political backlash against the M’Culloch
opinion and the Marshall Court demonstrated Marshall attempted a task
beyond the Court’s competence. Perhaps it took the Civil War to ultimately
resolve the question. Perhaps, a more nuanced approach than Marshall was
willing to take would have brought less fury and outrage upon the Court.
In any event, the reaction to M’Culloch indicates that sometimes lawyers’
work, even brilliant lawyers’ work, is not enough. The Court must
understand some seemingly legal issues are sometimes incapable of final
judicial resolution.
The Dred Scott opinion may be the premier example of that principle.
Apparently, the Court believed that it could provide a definitive resolution
to the question of slavery in the territories that was tearing the country apart.
This was not simply a case of judicial arrogance. Political institutions invited
the Court to intervene and resolve the issue. However, reflection should
have indicated that an issue so fundamental and so intense could not be
settled by judicial decree regardless of the outcome. There was nothing the
Court could say to appease the losing side. Unlike Marshall in M’Culloch,
Chief Justice Taney did not succeed in supporting his decision with
plausible legal argument.413 Further, for the first time in the Court’s history,
Justice Taney characterized the decision as politics rather than law. But
whether the decision was legally justifiable—and some believe that it was—
was not the only difficulty. The primary difficulty was the Court attempting
to settle an issue that could not be judicially resolved. Dred Scott is perhaps
the most glaring example of the real limits of judicial power. As it turned
out, only a catastrophic civil war could provide an answer.

413. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451 (1857) (attempting to project the Constitution as
making no distinguishment between a slave as property and other property of a citizen).
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The Lochner era is another instance in which the Court seems to have lost
legitimacy with the public. It may have initially self-corrected, but the
ultimate correction came through the appointment and confirmation
process. The Lochner era is shorthand for a thirty-year period in which the
Court sporadically rejected both federal and state efforts to regulate
economic matters on constitutional grounds. With respect to the
invalidation of state legislation, the reliance on substantive due process can
be challenged as transparently value oriented as with Dred Scott and
Roe v. Wade. However, both the narrow construction of the Commerce
Clause in the federal regulatory cases and the expansive conception of the
substantive due process liberty of contract can be defended as incorrect but
at least plausible legal arguments. The primary problem with the Lochner era
cases was not that the Court was failing to do “lawyers’ work;” rather, it was
attempting to resolve an issue beyond the scope of judicial competence,
which is the role of the government in regulating the economy. Individually,
the issues presented in the Lochner era cases—whether a particular piece of
federal legislation was within the congressional commerce power, or
whether state legislation was inconsistent with substantive due process—
seemed justiciable. However, taken together these cases raised a larger
question pertaining to the judicial role in supervising federal and state
regulatory power over economic affairs. In his classic dissent in Lochner,
Justice Holmes criticized the majority both for its doctrine and for deciding
an issue which was inappropriate for judicial resolution.414 Justice Harlan’s
dissent concentrated primarily on the latter ground.415 The Lochner era
cases can be criticized as doctrinally incorrect or overly value oriented.
However, the best understanding as to why the public, through the
appointments process, ultimately eliminated this line of cases is that for a
period of almost forty years, the Court had attempted to address and resolve
an issue beyond its legitimate authority. As with McCulloch and Dred Scott,
the problem was not so much the Court was failing to do “lawyer’s work,”
but rather it was attempting to answer questions beyond competence of
lawyers’ work to answer.
Yet another instance in which the Court grew out of synch with the public
and was disciplined through the appointment process involved the
Warren Court. There was no single decision that led to an effective political
backlash, but rather an aggregation of decisions in several areas of law.
414. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
415. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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However, one area that stands out as marshaling political forces against the
Court is constitutional criminal procedure, as best exemplified by the
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.416 Perhaps the Warren Court’s most
enduringly unpopular decisions were the school prayer cases. The problem
with the Warren Court decisions was not lack of plausible legal justification,
although professional critics both in dissent and law reviews dispute the
Court’s inattention to legal craft. Rather, the political backlash against the
Warren Court was more attributable to the sense that a majority of the Court
was employing the legal process to radically alter settled expectations in
every area of the law. As such, it was tagged with the epithets of “judicial
activism” or “legislating from the bench.”
The Court could be faulted for its interpretive doctrinal analysis, but the
general public was almost certainly unaware of that and could not care less.
Rather, the backlash against the Warren Court was motivated by the results
of the decisions. Not of any particular decision, but rather the aggregation
of opinions suggesting a large-scale pattern of change inconsistent with
public opinion. The backlash against the Warren Court tends to confirm
the theory of judicial legitimacy. That is, the Court has a relatively deep
reservoir of diffuse support, permitting it to render decisions from time to
time that go against the grain of public opinion.
However, that support is not unlimited. If the Court clashes with deeply
held public values too frequently in a brief period of time, the Court’s
goodwill may be exhausted, and the Court may pay a political price.
Arguably, that it is what happened at the end of the Warren Court. The
President and the Senate used the appointment and confirmation process to
alter the direction of the Court not because the Justices were not doing
“lawyers’ work” but rather because of the revolutionary nature of so many
of the Court’s decisions. In a sense, the reaction against the Warren Court
bears similarities to the backlash against the Marshall Court and McCulloch.
In each instance, the Court attempted to move the public too far and too
fast in a direction it was not prepared to go.
That brings us to the Burger Court and Roe v. Wade. To the extent that
recent changes in the Court’s membership can be attributable to political
backlash, Roe would seem to be at the center of the storm. Roe led to a
416. See Aaron J. Ley & Gordie Verhovek, The Political Foundations of Miranda v. Arizona and the
Quarles Public Safety Exception, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 206, 228 (“Congress’s response to Miranda v.
Arizona was forceful. Blaming Miranda and the Supreme Court for the increase of crime in the United
States became a popular pastime among legislators.”).
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backlash against the Court for a variety of reasons. As Justice Scalia argued
in his Planned Parenthood dissent, the decision seemed to be the product of a
judicial value judgment as opposed to “lawyers’ work.”417 That charge can
be made to a greater extent against Roe than any prior case that has led to a
political reaction against the Court, although some critiques of Dred Scott are
similar. Second, the decision was at war with the deeply held beliefs and
values of a significant segment of the public. It matters little, whether at any
given time, a slight majority approves or disapproves of the decision.
Contrary to other historically controversial decisions such as Brown v.
Board of Education or Miranda v. Arizona, time does not serve to dissipate
disapproval of Roe. It is almost fifty-years since the Court decided Roe and
the political backlash against the case seems to be stronger than ever. The
primary problem with Roe however, as identified in Justice White’s dissent
and in Professor Ely’s early critique, is that the political issue of whether a
fetus is a human being constitutionally protected by law was none of the
Court’s business.418 Rather it could only decide the matter by judicial fiat
which it did.
However, by initially attempting to resolve the issue, the Court painted
itself into a corner from which there is no easy escape. There will virtually
always be a significant constituency that cares ever deeply about the right to
life and will continue to seek to overturn Roe, especially through the
appointment process. By recognizing a constitutional right to abortion in
Roe, the Court created a significant constituency devoted to Roe and equally
determined to employ all means, including the appointment process to
preserve the abortion right. As such there is no way out for the Court.
Whatever it does in future abortion cases, it will almost certainly make one
side or the other very angry. It is unusual for the Court to find itself in such
a no-win situation especially over an extended period of time. Normally,
the public grows accustomed to Supreme Court decisions and would not be
particularly upset by either their retention or rejection. Not so with Roe. It
is expected by some and feared by others that the present Court will limit,
if not totally reject the abortion right. A failure to do anything will certainly
anger the significant segment of the public that supported President Trump
and his three Supreme Court appointments in hope that Roe would be
rejected. On the other hand, the overruling of Roe or a further significant
417. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981–82 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
418. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). See generally Ely, supra note
83 (providing an overview of where the Court’s majority opinion went askew).
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narrowing will enrage the substantial segment of the public that highly
treasure the decision and the right it created. Almost by definition, a
decision that places the Court in such a continuing bind should never have
been decided in the first place. As Justice Scalia and many others have
observed, Roe has had an extraordinary deleterious impact on the judicial
confirmation process, turning the confirmation of any justice who might
vote to alter into all out political war.
There are many reasons that the Supreme Court appointments became a
crucial issue in the 2016 presidential election, including decisions with
respect to freedom of religion and same-sex marriage. But, at the very center
of the controversy was Roe v. Wade. The prospect of a Supreme Court
majority narrowing or overruling Roe almost certainly played a significant
role in the election of Donald Trump. In that sense, this was one more
example of the political process counter-attacking the Court’s direction. As
such, it is simply a further instance of constitutionally based checks on the
Court in action.
If the Justices are concerned with public support, they may attempt to
thread the needle by applying Casey’s undue burden standard to uphold some
abortion regulation while invalidating others. On the other hand, some or
all of the Justices may ignore public opinion and simply decide the matter
by applicable legal principles. In that event, the Justices will need to focus
on whether a decision that some believe to have been incorrectly decided
from the outset should now be rejected.
The counterargument will be stare decisis. By definition, that doctrine
assumes that incorrect decisions should generally be allowed to stand as
precedent. That would be especially true with respect to a decision like Roe,
which is close to fifty-years old and has been relied on by the Court on
countless occasions. Moreover, the Court explicitly addressed overruling
Roe in Casey twenty-five years ago, and while narrowing it, upheld its essence.
Accordingly, as a matter of stare decisis, the case against overruling Roe is
formidable. It is most likely that a majority of the Court will apply the Casey
undue burden standard in a manner more sympathetic to abortion
regulation. However, one cannot predict with any accuracy what the Court
is likely to do given the Justices themselves are likely to be very divided in
their approaches. Whatever the Court does in the abortion area, it can
expect a deluge of public criticism.
Much of the criticism of the present Court alleges it behaves in a partisan
manner by rubber stamping constitutionally dubious actions taken by
President Trump. This critique presents several complicated questions.
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First, this argument is usually made by partisan critics of President Trump
who may be attempting to intimidate the Justices and to lower respect for
the Court in view of its perceived conservative tilt. If so, it may be the critics
who are attempting to politicize the Court instead of the Justices themselves.
Moreover, if it appears certain district judges are employing their injunctive
power to aid the resistance to the President and his policies, Supreme Court
intervention might well constitute appropriate intervention against a
politicized use of the judicial process.
Nevertheless, empirical research tends to indicate that the public has
traditionally accorded the Court greater approval than other governmental
institutions because it considers the Court different in that it has been
perceived as principled, fair, and non-partisan. If the public does come to
view the Court as simply doing the President’s bidding in high profile cases
involving presidential policy, its traditional high approval could suffer.
Whether that happens depends on how many of such cases the Court
decides, how they are decided, whether they are highly publicized, and
ultimately whether the public cares about the results. So far, cases involving
the President and his policies, though highly publicized, have constituted a
minuscule portion of the Court’s docket. However, there is a risk that if the
Court decides too many important and controversial cases in favor of the
President, the Court’s image as neutral and non-partisan might suffer.
However, in a highly polarized polity, it is likely that partisan disapproval
may be cancelled out to a large extent by partisan approval. In addition,
based on past experience, public disapproval of the Court based on
disagreement with specific decisions tends to dissipate fairly quickly.
One way in which the Court could attempt to minimize threats to its
public support is to decide fewer controversial cases of concern to the
public, especially cases raising hotly contested cultural issues. This would
require the Court to engage in strategic decisions with respect to docket
management, which it almost certainly does in any event given the volume
of certiorari petitions presented. As noted earlier, due largely to the public
invisibility of this process, it would be unlikely to have an adverse impact on
the Court’s reputation. The overwhelming amount of the Court’s docket is
composed of technical legal questions of little interest to the public. The
cases of public salience, to use the jargon of political science, tend to come
in two varieties. There are those questions presented under specific
constitutional provisions which the Court is expected and accustomed to
interpret. Many of the Court’s most controversial decisions fall in this
category. Does First Amendment freedom of speech prohibit legislation
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prohibiting burning of the American flag or criminalizing categorically
defined hate speech?
Does the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment prohibit legislation establishing vouchers that can be used
to pay tuition at religious schools or does it prohibit school-sponsored
prayers at public school graduations? Does the Commerce Clause authorize
Congress to impose a mandate requiring private individuals to purchase
health insurance? These cases raise publicly controversial issues, but they
also clearly implicate specific constitutional provisions the Court is expected
to interpret, at least when raised in otherwise justiciable cases presented for
review.
Arguably, the question is qualitatively different when the Court is asked
to rule that the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause must be
interpreted to recognize a right to obtain an abortion, or the right to assisted
suicide or the right to same-sex marriage. In these cases, the Court is being
asked to substitute a judicial value judgment for the conclusions of elected
legislatures. It is these substantive due process cases in which the Court
strays farthest from traditional lawyers’ work, entering the political domain
and, as Justice Scalia charged, inevitably taking sides in a culture war. It is
the likelihood that the Court will disengage from deciding these types of
cases that has fueled the battle over Supreme Court confirmations in recent
years.
The Court cannot avoid all controversy, nor should it. Many of the most
contentious issues in contemporary society end up in litigation, implicating
specific constitutional provisions. Most legal issues, including many of the
most controversial, are ultimately resolved by the lower federal courts. The
Supreme Court does not have the time or resources to address every cuttingedge issue of constitutional law. Still, the Court sits atop the federal judicial
system and plays a significant supervisory role. If the Court concludes the
lower federal courts have made serious errors with respect to the
interpretation of the constitution or federal law, or that the circuits are split
on an important interpretive question, the Supreme Court may have to
intervene regardless of the politically controversial nature of the issue. The
Court has control of its docket, but within limits. The Court must decide
certain cases it might otherwise choose to avoid if it is to perform its job as
head of the federal judiciary.
Another strategy to protect the Court’s moral capital is constitutional
minimalism. Professor Bickel endorsed the approach to an extent in The

2021] “LAWYERS’ WORK”: DOES THE COURT HAVE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS?

379

Least Dangerous Branch.419 Professor Sunstein wrote a book describing and
recommending that approach,420 though, as a progressive confronting a
conservative leaning Court, his arguments may be somewhat
disingenuous.421 Chief Justice Roberts seems to have adopted a minimalist
approach to constitutional interpretation. Minimalism consists of deciding
cases on the narrowest grounds reasonably presented. It is consistent with
a restrained approach to the judicial role, emphasizing that courts are better
equipped to appreciate factual particulars than abstract principles.
Minimalism is derived from the traditional approach to common law
adjudication. It assumes that courts are incapable of understanding the big
picture and hence derive general principles only after working through
several specific cases, which in the aggregate will help illuminate the larger
themes of the law. Minimalism is a device designed to protect against
judicial error. The narrower the decision, the less likely the Court will
stumble into incorrect principle. In addition, narrow decisions are easier to
correct or at least distinguish. Likewise, if there is a fear of public
disapproval, the narrower the decision, the lower the risk, unless of course
the relevant public was expecting a broad and definitive resolution. Judicial
minimalism is a means through which, over time, the Court can recalibrate
the public perception of the appropriate role of the Court from that of an
all-purpose problem solver to that of a body obligated to adjudicate properly
presented disputes between parties before the Court with respect for the
decisions of more democratic institutions.
Minimalism is also a means by which Justices who agree on a particular
result, but for very different reasons, can be persuaded to join a narrow
factually particular decision. Sometimes, minimalism will be a deliberate
strategy by the majority to decide a case in the narrowest possible manner.
On other occasions, it will be a necessity thrust upon the Court in an attempt
to construct a majority opinion when there is significant disagreement
among the Justices joining that opinion. In either event, judicial minimalism

419. See generally BICKEL, supra note 17 (discussing the idea of the Court deciding cases on
narrower grounds when able as opposed deciding them on substantive grounds).
420. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT ix (1999) (“My goal in this book is to identify and defend a distinctive form of judicial
decision-making, which I call ‘minimalism.’”); see also Eskridge Jr., supra note 313, at 1283 (discussing
similar suggestions).
421. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 358, at 1087 (observing “liberal and left-wing scholars
have embraced procedural arguments about the [C]ourt’s proper role as a way of combating changes
in constitutional doctrine” while also noting “Sunstein’s embrace of constitutional minimalism”).
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has advantages. Returning the Court to a more restrained role should over
time bolster its reputation with the public. However, in the short run there
will be disappointment by those who have been conditioned to believe the
appropriate role of the Court is to ultimately resolve societal conflicts that
political institutions have been unable to settle.
Based on historical experience and long-term public polling, there is little
reason to believe the Court faces a legitimacy crisis based on a decline in
public support. The Court’s public support appears to be sufficiently deep
to protect against public disappointment with particular decisions. Indeed,
many of the Court’s signature precedents including the prohibition of
school prayer, the approval of limited racial preferences in educational
admissions, and expanding the protection of criminal defendants, have not
even to this day evoked majoritarian support from the public and yet the
Court as an institution remains well respected. This illustrates the Court has
a relatively broad protected zone in which to operate. Perhaps the wild card
is abortion, where the Court has worked itself into a position in which a
decisive decision in either direction might well imperil its reputation with a
significant segment of the public. As such, the Court appears to be on a
tight rope. Roe should offer caution with respect to future constitutional
adjudication. First, it illustrates—as should have been apparent from both
Dred Scott and Lochner—that substantive due process is a very dangerous
approach. It is dangerous in that it is transparently value oriented and
appears political. Likewise, unlike other accepted methods of interpretation,
there are no guard rails. Despite Justice Harlan’s classic dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, there is little that the Justices can rely on aside from their own
preferences or their perceptions of the public’s preferences. Sometimes,
that may not lead to trouble but often it has and will. Most importantly, this
is not the application of law but rather simply thinly disguised politics. As
such, as Justice Scalia recognized in his Casey dissent, it is unworthy of public
respect.
Perhaps, the most important lesson the Court should learn from Roe and
from prior instances in which the Court got significantly off-track with
public opinion is that there are some issues which may seem to involve a
legal question (i.e., whether Jane Roe was constitutionally entitled to receive
an abortion in Texas) but that may not be answered in a principled manner
by the Supreme Court. The questions are either too big and divisive or law
lacks the tools of resolution. When in such an instance and the Court
nevertheless presses ahead and tries to impose a judicial resolution, the
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attempt will fail, and constitutionally based appointment and confirmation
processes will provide some correction for judicial overreaching.
There is another lesson Roe teaches. Before entering a conflict, the
military attempts to ensure that there is an exit strategy. There must be a
means to assure that the conflict is not interminable. The same strategy
should apply to judicial ventures. The Court should not embark on a line
of precedent that may become problematic and from which there is no easy
escape. There is every reason to believe Roe was the product of gross
miscalculation. At the time Roe was decided, the Court had been on a roll.
It had ordered the desegregation of the public schools, imposed majoritarian
democracy in the face of longstanding practice to the contrary, moved the
country’s position on the death penalty, prohibited prayer in public schools,
reformed the criminal process, and had seemingly carried it all off with little
threat to the Court’s legitimacy. The fact Richard Nixon had been elected
on an anti-Court platform in 1968 should have suggested that all was not
well, but the Justices failed to notice. Indeed, two years after Roe, the Court
effectively ushered Nixon out of office.
The Court indicated in Roe it understood it was deciding a deeply
controversial issue, but there is no reason to believe it understood how
deeply divisive its decision was, how long the conflict would rage, the degree
to which it would envelop the appointment and confirmation process, and
the difficulty the Court would face in extricating itself from the abortion
conflict. As with Dred Scott, the Court seemed to walk into a buzz saw with
little awareness of what lay ahead. Foresight is difficult—perhaps
impossible. That is all the more reason for the Court to tread cautiously in
new areas of adjudication. The Justices seemed to believe they were engaged
in a careful balancing of interests. But the decision, when combined with
the companion case of Doe v. Bolton and as subsequently and somewhat
stridently interpreted by the Court, was extremely broad and one-sided. The
wise decision would have been for the Court to abstain completely.
However, if the Court was determined to wade into the question of the
constitutionality of abortion regulation, it would have been a perfect
instance for the exercise of minimalism, deciding no more than what was
absolutely required, as some have suggested. The Court may be unable to
predict accurately at the time of its decisions whether trouble is lurking
ahead, but it should be able to decide cases in a manner that minimizes the
risks.
Justice Scalia was correct in insisting the public will generally leave the
Court alone as long as it believes the Court is deciding cases through
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application of the tools of the lawyer’s craft. The Court has built up a
sufficient cushion of support to permit it to decide cases in opposition to
public opinion without sacrificing its legitimacy. However, there are limits.
If at some point the public concludes the Court is attempting to resolve
conflicts beyond its competence, the appointment and confirmation process
will be used, as it has been used in the past, to alter the Court’s direction. It
may be a slow-moving check, but it provides the ultimate and effective
answer to charges of illegitimacy.

